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NOTES 
WHITHER FAIRNESS?  
IN SEARCH OF A JURISDICTIONAL TEST 




In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the issue of personal 
jurisdiction over alien corporations in products liability cases.  J. McIntyre 
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro was the Court’s first statement on the issue in 
twenty-four years.  The opinion, handed down almost ten years after the 
injury that gave rise to the litigation, could not command a majority of the 
Justices.  Writing for a plurality, Justice Kennedy set forth a strict standard 
that required that a manufacturer’s products be specifically targeted at a 
given forum state for jurisdiction to be proper. 
This Note argues that, while Kennedy’s opinion did not necessarily 
violate the letter of jurisdictional doctrine—for in reality, there is no 
discernible letter—it violated the spirit.  In analyzing the origins, 
development, and application of personal jurisdiction over the centuries, 
this Note concludes that the current palette of jurisdictional tests is not 
sufficient to meet the demands of fairness in cases like Nicastro.  Using 
simple tort concepts as analogues, this Note advances a new test capable of 
doing justice without violating due process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On October 11, 2001, Robert Nicastro showed up at his job at a scrap 
metal plant in New Jersey.1  In the usual course of his work, calamity 
struck:  his hand got caught in a shearing machine, and he lost four fingers.2  
He felt that the machine had been poorly designed, and sued in New Jersey 
state court to recover for his injuries.3  Ultimately, his case made its way to 
the U.S. Supreme Court.4
The issue driving the litigation had nothing to do with Nicastro’s hand.  
Nobody ever asked whether the machine was, in fact, negligently designed, 
or even dangerous.  Instead, the Supreme Court decided that Nicastro had 
gone about the process all wrong:  he had brought the case in the wrong 
 
 
 1. See Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. at 577–79. 
 4. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
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court!5  Because the company that made the machine—J. McIntyre 
Machinery, Ltd.—did not have an office in New Jersey, and had not 
specifically targeted the machine for sale in that state, it could not be sued 
in New Jersey, even if the defect caused serious and irreparable injury 
there.6
This Note questions why courts are reluctant to hold foreign and alien 
corporations amenable to suit in jurisdictions where their products cause 
serious injury.
 
7  To some, it may be an intuitively agreeable notion that a 
farmer from Florida should not be forced to defend himself in an Alaska 
state court simply at the whim of the plaintiff, if the farmer has never had 
any contact whatsoever with Alaska.8  But can that intuition also be 
credibly extended to Nicastro’s case?  Is it simply unconstitutionally 
inconvenient to fly back and forth from Tallahassee to Juneau to defend 
oneself?9  Is remote litigation an unconstitutional surprise to the luckless 
farmer?10  Or does our federal system demand that states avoid meddling in 
the affairs of far-flung jurisdictions without a good reason?11
It seems fair to allow Nicastro to pursue redress for his injuries in the 
state in which they occurred.  Reluctant to adopt such a position, the 
 
 
 5. See id. at 2790–91. 
 6. See id. 
 7. For the purposes of this Note, the term “foreign” shall be used to identify U.S. 
entities in states outside the forum asserting jurisdiction.  The term “alien” shall be used to 
identify entities in nations outside those bounds.  Because “substantially the same rules of 
personal jurisdiction have been applied both to domestic and alien defendant corporations,” 
these distinctions are purely semantic herein. Matthew D. Richardson, The Outer Limits of In 
Personam Jurisdiction over Alien Corporations:  The National Contacts Theory, 16 GEO. 
WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 637, 637 (1982). 
 8. See, e.g., Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (grounding a jurisdictional test in this 
hypothetical). 
 9. See Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 203–04 (E.D. 
Pa. 1974); Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction 
in the Federal Courts, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 38–39 (1984) (noting that the Supreme Court 
considers inconvenience and unreasonableness of lawsuits in distant forums relevant factors 
in determining the legitimacy of jurisdiction in federal cases). But see Allan R. Stein, Styles 
of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 
689, 704–05 (1987) (“[C]onvenience has played a peripheral role” in determining the 
legitimacy of subjecting defendants to suit in distant forums). 
 10. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (“The 
[Constitution] . . . gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential 
defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that 
conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.”). 
 11. See id. at 294 (“[E]ven if the forum State is the most convenient location for 
litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may 
sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.”); see also 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878) (finding a violation of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment where a court “determine[s] the personal rights and obligations 
of parties over whom [a] court has no jurisdiction”). But see Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. 
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702–03 n.10 (1982) (noting that the Due 
Process Clause does not mention federalism; protecting parties from far-flung adjudicatory 
proceedings is, rather, an “individual liberty interest”).  The Bauxites Court also observed 
that, because a defendant can waive the defense of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(h), the right arguably inheres in the individual who can dispose of it, 
and not in the several states who wish to preserve their adjudicatory interest. Id. at 704. 
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Supreme Court has made references to federalism12 and a defendant’s 
purposeful conduct aimed at the forum state13 as key elements of 
jurisdictional doctrine.  The empathetic desire to provide adequate relief to 
injured plaintiffs in the forum of their injury is not always sufficient to 
justify an assertion of jurisdiction.14
With respect to corporations, the Supreme Court has held that, for a 
corporation to be sued in a state not its own, the exercise of jurisdiction 
must be reasonable.
 
15  In J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, the 
Court’s most recent foray into personal jurisdiction,16 Justice Kennedy 
concluded that it was not reasonable to subject an English corporation to a 
New Jersey state court’s jurisdiction, even though:  (1) the corporation 
commissioned an agent to sell its metal-shearing machines in the United 
States; (2) the corporation’s representatives had attended annual 
conventions in several states to market its machines to U.S. buyers; (3) at 
least one of these machines wound up in New Jersey; and (4) one of these 
machines severed four fingers from Robert Nicastro’s right hand.17
This is not the case of a Floridian farmer suddenly being forced to fly to 
Juneau to defend himself simply because he sold an orange to a distributor 
in Tallahassee.
 
18  A New Jersey resident has four fewer fingers because of 
something that happened in his home state.  These missing digits were 
allegedly due to the negligence of an alien corporation.19  This Note 
concludes that an instinct, based on fairness, to allow a New Jersey court to 
exercise jurisdiction over J. McIntyre is legitimate, reasonable, and 
constitutional.20
 
 12. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293–94. 
 
 13. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
 14. See infra Part I.C. 
 15. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.  Reasonableness considers not only 
the inconveniences to and burden on the defendant, but also the “forum State’s interest in 
adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective 
relief . . . the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 
controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental 
substantive social policies.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 16. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).  Nicastro was decided by a plurality opinion on June 27, 
2011.  On the same day, the Court handed down a unanimous decision in Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).  In Goodyear, the Court invalidated 
the exercise of general jurisdiction over a corporation, that is, jurisdiction based purely on 
the systematic presence of a defendant in a given forum. Id. at 2851.  This Note is concerned 
only with specific jurisdiction:  the exercise of judicial authority based on a discernible act, 
committed by a defendant, and related to the controversy. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788; 
see also Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate:  A 
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1144–47 (1966). 
 17. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2785–86. 
 18. But see id. at 2790 (expressing concern that if the defendant corporation were held 
amenable to suit in Nicastro, then an owner of a “small Florida farm” would also be 
amenable to suit in Alaska if she entered into an agreement with a large-scale distributor 
who sold her products in all fifty states). 
 19. See Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010). 
 20. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Introduction to HENRY M. HART, 
JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:  BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW, at cxiii (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) 
(“When Henry Hart taught ‘Federal Courts’ for the last time, during the Spring Term of 
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Part I of this Note tracks the evolution of personal jurisdiction from its 
origins to the modern day.  This history will discuss the inconsistencies in 
the doctrine, which leave it open to interpretation and refinement as new 
fact patterns present themselves.  Part II analyzes the Nicastro decision, and 
argues that the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to clarify the doctrine 
and achieve a just result for all parties.  Part III proposes a standard of 
jurisdictional analysis that uses principles of tort law as models through 
which jurisdiction may be more cogently and fairly applied. 
I.  TWO CENTURIES OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
Part I explores the winding road that jurisdictional doctrine has traveled.  
It begins by discussing the support for understanding personal jurisdiction 
as a constitutional mandate.  It then explores various other justifications that 
the Supreme Court has used to resolve interstate jurisdictional disputes.  
Part I concludes by analyzing the “stream of commerce” doctrine, an 
analytical tool that courts use to resolve jurisdictional cases where a 
plaintiff sues a corporation based upon the existence of its product in a 
given state, despite the absence of the corporation’s actual presence. 
A.  Protecting Defendants from Unreasonable Power 
Maria lives in New York State.  Duncan, from Seattle, sues in 
Washington state court to collect on a debt.  Maria might be tempted to sit 
comfortably in Albany and spurn Duncan’s attempt to sue her three 
thousand miles away.  However, if she fails to appear in court, a default 
judgment will be entered against her, which will prevent her from 
challenging the merits of the case at a later date.  If and when Duncan seeks 
to collect, Maria can only launch a collateral attack on the issue of 
jurisdiction.21  Once a decision is rendered in Washington (or any other 
state), New York is compelled to recognize it as valid.  This is because 
Article IV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution mandates that the judicial 
proceedings in specific states be given “full faith and credit” in the several 
states.22
 
1965, he brought into class the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill.  The 
Court applied the just-enacted Civil Rights Act of 1964 to abate Southern prosecutions of 
sit-in demonstrators.  Hart stated the facts and relevant authorities, including a federal statute 
creating a presumption against finding abatement of prosecutions by new statutes.  It was 
apparent . . . that the decision was about to be analytically dissected.  But, rather than 
launching into the sort of devastating critique of which he was capable, Hart paused and 
reflected to himself, his eyes focused on his reprint of the Court’s opinion.  The class 
stopped for thirty breathless seconds.  Finally, Hart looked up at the class and said:  
‘Sometimes, sometimes, you just have to do the right thing.’”). 
 
 21. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 706 
(1982). 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 483–85 
(1813) (holding that specific state court judgments must be given conclusive effect, and not 
merely evidentiary effect, in other states); ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 
2-3 to 2-4 (1983). 
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But it certainly does not seem right to bind Maria to a Washington 
judgment if she has never even been to Washington in the first place.  The 
doctrine of personal jurisdiction serves to protect Maria, and all those 
similarly situated, from litigation in states with which they have no contact 
whatsoever.23
The Supreme Court first used the term “personal jurisdiction” in an 
opinion finding that foreign nations share concurrent jurisdiction with the 
United States when a crime is committed by an American on a private 
foreign vessel.
 
24  In support of this proposition, the Court did not cite the 
Constitution, but turned to Emmerich de Vattel’s The Law of Nations, 
published in 1758, as a governing authority on matters of international 
personal jurisdiction.25  Not until fifty-nine years later did the Court first 
articulate a purely constitutional basis for personal jurisdiction.26  At the 
outset, jurisdictional restraint had its origins in international policy, and not 
in the Constitution.27
Personal jurisdiction is therefore a doctrine often explained through the 
use of hypotheticals with results that seem fair.
 
28  From its inception, the 
propriety of the result, and not necessarily the method of arriving at it, has 
been the relevant jurisdictional inquiry.29
Early critics of broad jurisdictional reach expressed concern that the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause could lead to improper results, as an unbridled 
system of several state judiciaries could unfairly subject foreign defendants 
to litigation in states “unconnected” to the underlying controversy.
 
30  The 
Supreme Court addressed this concern in D’Arcy v. Ketchum, an 1850 case 
that announced the right of non-resident defendants not to be subject to 
unanticipated litigation in states where they were not present and had no 
contacts.31
 
 23. See CASAD, supra note 
 
22, at 2-5 to 2-6. 
 24. See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 621 (1818). 
 25. Id. at 621 nn.d–e; see also GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL 
CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 78 (4th ed. 2007) (early U.S. courts and 
commentators looked to international law and comity as a basis for jurisdictional principles). 
 26. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878); see infra Part I.B. 
 27. There is evidence that, with respect to state court jurisdiction over international 
defendants, the framers agreed that jurisdiction over aliens was a prudential rather than 
constitutional matter. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 485 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam 
Classic ed., 2003) (“So great a proportion of the cases in which foreigners are parties involve 
national questions, that it is by far most safe and most expedient to refer all those in which 
they are concerned to the national tribunals.”).  If jurisdiction is a prudential matter, it is 
perhaps best to leave it in the hands of judges, whose experience in balancing close 
jurisdictional questions will obtain more just results than rigid doctrinal analysis. See 
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 516–17 (6th ed. 2009) (doctrines that are arguably prudential or 
constitutional benefit from an evolving common law supported by judicial expertise in 
procedure); infra Part III.B. 
 28. See infra notes 173, 208 (Supreme Court Justices using hypotheticals to explain their 
jurisdictional tests). 
 29. See infra notes 120, 229 and accompanying text (a test based on fairness). 
 30. Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 485–86 (1813) (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
 31. See 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 175–76 (1850) (holding that the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause did not bind defendants to a state’s judgment when they were neither present in the 
2012] JURISDICTION AFTER NICASTRO 2981 
B.  Judicial Developments in the Doctrine 
This section follows the Supreme Court’s evolution from a strict 
jurisdictional standard to a more permissive analysis based on fairness.  It 
begins with a case in which jurisdiction was seen purely as a matter of 
actual presence.32
1.  Pennoyer v. Neff 
  It then analyzes the Court’s decision to relax that 
standard in order to achieve more just results.  It concludes by 
demonstrating the doctrinal confusion that resulted from a rule whose 
origins are uncertain and inconsistently cited. 
The right of non-resident defendants to be safe from litigation in states 
with which they did not have any contact, first articulated in D’Arcy, was 
affirmed by the landmark case of Pennoyer v. Neff.33  Pennoyer held that a 
person who is not physically present in a state simply cannot be subject to 
that state’s adjudicatory power.34  Perhaps because of the “power”-based 
origins of this rule,35 Justice Field found a constitutional basis for it, 
declaring that “proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal 
rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do 
not constitute due process of law.”36
 
adjudicating state nor served with process); see also Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350, 
367 (1873) (“The tribunals of one State have no jurisdiction over the persons of other States 
unless found within their territorial limits; they cannot extend their process into other States, 
and any attempt of the kind would be treated . . . as an act of usurpation . . . .”). But see 
Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 406–08 (1855) (holding that it was not 
unreasonable to bind an Indiana corporation to an Ohio court’s decision when that 
corporation had appointed an agent to work in Ohio). 
  The Court applied the Pennoyer rule 
to corporations in 1915, finding that the Due Process Clause would not 
permit suit against a corporation that had no presence whatsoever in the 
 32. The physical presence requirement was, at first, rooted in the physical power of a 
state to bring a civil defendant under its control by actual arrest in order to subject him to 
now-antiquated procedural norms. See CASAD, supra note 22, at 2-10 to 2-11. 
 33. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
 34. See id. at 723–24.  Pennoyer also explained that jurisdiction over property is 
different from jurisdiction over a person. Id.  When a plaintiff’s claim is related to a 
defendant’s property, and that defendant is not present in the state, the property in question 
may be attached as part of a default judgment even when the defendant is not personally 
found within the state. Id. 
 35. See supra note 32; see also infra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 36. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733. But see Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay Kane, The 
Exercise of Jurisdiction over and Enforcement of Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39 
HASTINGS L.J. 799, 814–15 (1988) (suggesting that, because Pennoyer based its holding in 
principles of sovereignty with respect to international law, the jurisdiction that is relevant 
with respect to alien defendants is “American jurisdiction, and not the more specific [state] 
jurisdiction”); Stephen E. Gottlieb, In Search of the Link Between Due Process and 
Jurisdiction, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 1291, 1294–95 (1983) (finding fault with Pennoyer for 
grounding its allegedly constitutional holding in principles of international law, where the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause does not apply).  
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adjudicating state.37  In so holding, the Court relied on the fiction of 
corporate personhood.38
The Court’s rigid framework, based solely on physical presence, inspired 
several states to adopt consent-based laws that allowed their courts to 
exercise jurisdiction over people and corporations who had, at least in a 
theoretical sense, appointed agents competent to receive service of process 
on the travelers’ behalf.
   
39  The Court’s endorsement of consent-based laws 
marked its acknowledgement that states have a compelling interest in 
regulating conduct that transpires within their borders, particularly when 
issues of public safety are concerned.40
2.  International Shoe and Jurisdiction over Corporations:  
Pennoyer Survives, but Barely 
 
The Supreme Court adapted Pennoyer’s in-state requirement to a more 
technologically advanced era in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.41  In 
International Shoe, the defendant was a non-resident corporation that had 
no offices, kept no inventory, and made no contracts in the forum state.42  It 
employed about a dozen salesmen within the forum, and would ship goods 
to the forum whenever an order was placed.43  The Court upheld 
jurisdiction over the defendant because this comported with traditional 
conceptions of fairness.44
While some commentators viewed International Shoe as a rejection of 
Pennoyer’s presence requirement,
 
45 it has also been read simply as a 
refinement of the doctrine.46
 
 37. See Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 194 (1915). 
  Under International Shoe, a corporation may 
be found “present” in a forum, and therefore subject to suit, when it has 
certain “minimum contacts” with that forum, such that the exercise of 
jurisdiction does not “offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
 38. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).  
Though a corporation is an “artificial being,” id., the Court has nevertheless held that 
corporations are entitled to the due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, see 
Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889).       
 39. See, e.g., Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 164 (1916) (discussing a law that 
demanded that out-of-state motorists sign a form appointing the Secretary of State as their 
attorney, upon whom service of process would be sufficient to establish jurisdiction over the 
motorists).  The Court later upheld a Massachusetts law providing that all motorists within 
the state had implicitly consented to appoint an agent to receive process on their behalf in 
any litigation resulting from an automobile accident. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 
356–57 (1927). 
 40. See Kane, 242 U.S. at 167–68. 
 41. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 42. See id. at 313. 
 43. See id. at 314. 
 44. Id. at 320. 
 45. See, e.g., Gregory Trautman, Personal Jurisdiction in the Post-World-Wide 
Volkswagen Era—Using a Market Analysis to Determine the Reach of Jurisdiction, 60 
WASH. L. REV. 155, 157 (1984). 
 46. See Stein, supra note 9, at 693. 
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justice.’”47  Because the personhood of a corporation is itself a fiction,48 the 
Court reasoned that corporate presence was also necessarily fictitious—it 
was the actions of corporate agents, and not necessarily the corporation 
itself, that were relevant in the new jurisdictional calculus.49  Because the 
cause of action “arose out of [the] . . . activities” that the defendant 
corporation had conducted within the forum, it was reasonable,50 according 
to the International Shoe Court, for a state to assert jurisdiction.51
But an existence of minimum contacts
 
52 was not the Court’s sole 
justification for finding jurisdiction proper.  Justice Stone also asserted that 
whenever a corporation “enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws” of a 
state, the corporation can and should expect to be subject to a suit within 
that state.53  The benefits of acting under a state’s laws accrue whenever an 
entity “exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state.”54
 
 47. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).  
Often overlooked in citations to International Shoe is the Court’s reliance on the 
obsolescence of writs of capias ad respondendum in justifying the minimum contacts 
hypothesis. Id.  Such writs commanded a “sheriff to take the defendant into custody to 
ensure that the defendant will appear in court.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 236 (9th ed. 
2009).  Once these writs “[gave] way to personal service of summons,” the Court did not 
find the due process implications of extraterritorial jurisdiction to be quite so grave. Int’l 
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.  By focusing the analysis on fairness, and less on due process, the 
Court implicitly acknowledged a compelling state interest in regulating tortious conduct by 
actors outside the state that causes harm within it. See Stein, supra note 9, at 698–99. 
  
These justifications for jurisdiction—state regulation of tortious conduct 
 48. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 49. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316–17; see also J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. 
Ct. 2780, 2798 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that International Shoe holds that 
corporate presence and implied consent to suit “should be discarded, for they conceal the 
actual bases on which jurisdiction rests”). 
 50. Though it did not expressly define what assertions of jurisdiction qualify as 
reasonable, the Court proposed that, in addition to minimum contacts, an “‘estimate of the 
inconveniences’ which would result to the corporation from a trial away from 
its . . . principal place of business” was a relevant factor in the determination of fair play. 
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 
(2d Cir. 1930)).  In response, Justice Black criticized the majority for applying “elastic 
standards” that did not have any textual basis in the Constitution. Id. at 325 (Black, J., 
concurring). 
 51. Id. at 320; see also Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 
(1952) (holding that the reasonableness of subjecting a foreign corporation to suit in a given 
state must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, with attention paid to the specific actions the 
corporation takes within or toward the given forum). 
 52. It is possible that, when International Shoe was decided, the word “minimum” had a 
definition akin to “minimal,” meaning that the doctrine was intended to allow states to enjoy 
broader jurisdiction across state lines. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (“due process requires 
only . . . minimum contacts”) (emphasis added).  Later decisions came to regard “minimum” 
as an adjectival threshold rather than a permissive proclamation. Cf. Fullerton, supra note 9, 
at 10 n.38; see also infra Part I.B.3 (discussing judicial swelling and retrenchment of 
jurisdictional principles after International Shoe). 
 53. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. 
 54. Id.  While minimum contacts have been interpreted as protecting a state’s regulatory 
interest, this prong of International Shoe has been read to be grounded in a contract-based 
exchange theory, under which a corporation implicitly agrees to hold itself amenable to suit 
in exchange for the exploitation of a state’s inner resources. See Stein, supra note 9, at 699–
700; see also supra note 47 (examining the state’s regulatory interest in minimum contacts). 
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and corporate consent to suit—have animated the Court’s subsequent 
jurisdictional jurisprudence.55
3.  Modern Doctrine:  The Court Tries to Apply International Shoe, 
and Nobody Agrees 
 
In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,56 the Court upheld the 
exercise of jurisdiction over a corporate defendant by conducting a 
minimum contacts analysis with reference to the state’s regulatory 
interest,57 and not to the forum benefits that the defendant corporation had 
enjoyed.58  In other words, following International Shoe, if the defendant 
could cause an actionable harm based upon the activity it conducted within 
the forum, jurisdiction would be proper.59
In McGee, an Arizona corporation, having no agents or offices in 
California, had issued an insurance policy to a California resident.
 
60  This 
single policy was the only evidence of the corporation doing any business 
whatsoever with any person in California.61  When a litigable claim arose 
out of this policy, the state’s “manifest interest in providing effective means 
of redress for its residents” was sufficient to justify jurisdiction despite the 
defendant’s very minimal contacts with the forum.62
The very next year, in Hanson v. Denckla,
 
63 the Court found jurisdiction 
improper when a Florida resident sued a Delaware trust company in Florida 
state court, even though the trustee had been remitting income to the 
plaintiff in Florida.64  Jurisdiction was rejected because, at the time the trust 
was formed, the plaintiff had been a resident of Pennsylvania; at no time 
had the defendant ever solicited business in Florida.65  Without mentioning 
fair play and substantial justice, the Court cited International Shoe for the 
proposition that the defendant had not obtained any benefit or privilege 
from doing business in the state of Florida, and therefore could not be sued 
in that state.66
 
 55. See Stein, supra note 9, at 700–03. 
  The state’s regulatory interest in this case was not addressed.  
Instead, the Court found the defendant’s “purposeful[] avail[ment] of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State” to be the essential 
 56. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
 57. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 58. McGee, 355 U.S. at 221–23. 
 59. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
 60. McGee, 355 U.S. at 221–22. 
 61. See id. at 222. 
 62. Id. at 223.  This reasoning has been found indicative of the Court’s willingness, in 
certain cases, to apply a flexible standard in determining whether jurisdiction is proper. See 
Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction over Alien and Domestic Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85, 90 
(1983).  Under this standard, fairness and convenience to the plaintiff are given great weight; 
this regulatory interest standard inspired one scholar to term McGee the “summit of 
permissible jurisdiction.” Id. at 89–90. 
 63. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
 64. Id. at 251–52. 
 65. Id. at 252. 
 66. Id. 
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element.67  Because the plaintiff’s move to Florida had been a “unilateral 
activity,” the defendant’s relationship to Florida could not sustain 
jurisdiction.68
Almost twenty years later, in Shaffer v. Heitner,
 
69 the Court considered 
whether jurisdiction could lie against a defendant purely because his 
property was within the forum state.70  In Shaffer, the plaintiff had sued 
directors of a Delaware corporation in a shareholders’ derivative suit.71  
Because the activities giving rise to the suit had taken place in Oregon, the 
plaintiff, suing in Delaware, attempted to attach jurisdiction by filing a 
motion for sequestration of the directors’ corporate stock.72
The Court concluded that, even if Delaware had a compelling interest in 
regulating the conduct of corporations within its borders, that interest was 
better addressed by a choice-of-law analysis than an assertion of jurisdiction 
based on a regulatory need.
 
73  When a state finds itself at the nexus of the 
controversy, the Court reasoned, the state may have its own law govern the 
dispute, but that does not empower the state to bring foreign defendants into 
its courts to be subjected to that law.74  Because of “our federal system of 
government,” “‘[the satisfaction of due process] must depend . . . upon the 
quality and nature of the [defendant’s] activity in relation to the fair and 
orderly administration of the laws.’”75
C.  The Stream of Commerce Doctrine 
 
This section explains personal jurisdiction in interstate and international 
products liability cases.  It begins with the tale of World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp. v. Woodson,76
 
 67. Id. at 253. 
 the Supreme Court’s first analysis of when it might be 
legitimate to exercise jurisdiction over a corporation that is not at all 
 68. Id.  The Hanson Court found state lines relevant not for the purpose of determining 
whether litigation was fair or convenient for the defendant, but for the purpose of preserving 
a federal system that respects the “territorial limitations on the power of the respective 
States.” Id. at 251. 
 69. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
 70. Id. at 199.  This type of jurisdiction, known as “quasi in rem” jurisdiction, had its 
foundations in the idea that it was legitimate for a plaintiff to have access to a defendant’s 
assets located within a forum state, as long as those assets were related to the controversy. 
See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 725–26 (1878).  This doctrine was later expanded to 
provide for jurisdiction over all defendants in general claims when they possessed any 
amount of property in the forum state. See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 223 (1905). 
 71. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 189–90. 
 72. Id. at 190. 
 73. Id. at 215–16.  Choice of law and personal jurisdiction are related but distinct 
constitutional inquiries.  A court’s decision to apply a particular state’s law to a given 
controversy can be justified only when a state’s contacts with the dispute demonstrate a 
regulatory interest, whereas the jurisdictional inquiry focuses on whether the defendant’s 
contacts with the forum are such that an assertion of jurisdiction to promote a regulatory 
interest does not violate the defendant’s individual liberty. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807–08, 821–23 (1985). 
 74. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 215. 
 75. Id. at 203–04 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317, 319 
(1945)). 
 76. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
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physically present—even with the benefit of a fiction77—in a given forum.  
It continues with an analysis of how courts and scholars interpreted the 
World-Wide Volkswagen decision.  It concludes with Asahi Metal Industry 
Co. v. Superior Court of California,78
1.  Origins 
 a case in which the Court attempted 
to clarify the doctrine, but only succeeded in muddying the waters. 
As personal jurisdiction lurched into the final two decades of the 
twentieth century, finding itself grounded alternately in conceptions of 
fairness to the plaintiff, fairness to the defendant, and notions of territorial 
federalism,79 the Supreme Court analyzed the propriety of exercising 
jurisdiction in a products liability case.  Harry and Kay Robinson, the 
plaintiffs in World-Wide Volkswagen, bought a car in the State of New 
York.80  A year later, the Robinsons left New York to move to Arizona.81  
While driving their new car across the country, they were involved in a car 
accident in Oklahoma.82  The resulting fire severely burned Kay Robinson 
and her children.83  The Robinsons brought suit in Oklahoma, alleging 
negligent design of the gas tank.84  Among those named as defendants were 
the regional distributor and retail dealer of the car.85  These defendants did 
not have any specific or direct contacts with the state of Oklahoma.86
The Court held that International Shoe’s minimum contacts test insulated 
these defendants from suit for two reasons.  First, a lack of contacts 
“protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or 
inconvenient forum,” and second, the minimum contacts test “acts to ensure 
that the States . . . do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by 
their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.”
   
87  In denying 
jurisdiction, the Court acknowledged that the forum state’s interest in 
regulating conduct is a relevant factor in determining jurisdictional fairness, 
and even conceded that protecting a defendant from inconvenient litigation 
was of diminishing importance in the same calculation.88
Even if the defendant would suffer . . . no inconvenience . . . even if the 
forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; 
even if the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the 
Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may 
  But the Court 
ultimately set fairness and regulatory interests aside, declaring: 
 
 77. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 78. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 79. For a discussion of each justification, see supra Part I.B. 
 80. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See id. at 288–89. 
 87. Id. at 292. 
 88. See id. at 292–93. 
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sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid 
judgment.89
The Court held that even though the defendant could theoretically foresee 
that a car—an inherently mobile product
 
90—could wind up in Oklahoma, 
the foreseeability of harm was not enough to confer jurisdiction on 
Oklahoma state courts.91  It was the “foreseeability . . . that the defendant’s 
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should 
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there” that was key.92  The 
Court concluded that federalism concerns would have yielded to this 
foreseeability if the defendants had purposefully availed themselves of the 
privileges of doing business in Oklahoma.93
Foreseeable litigation in a distant forum would be reasonable when a 
corporation “delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the 
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.”
 
94  
The Court referred to the “stream of commerce” as the course of trade when 
a manufacturer makes an effort “to serve directly or indirectly, the market 
for its product in other States.”95
 
 89. Id. at 294.  This declaration of the primacy of federalism appeared to herald an era in 
which the Court was no longer willing to balance equities to determine jurisdictional 
fairness. See Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to Minimum Contacts:  Asahi Metal Industry Co. 
v. Superior Court, 39 S.C. L. REV. 729, 756–57 (1988).  Interstate federalism did not hold the 
championship belt for long.  Two years later, the Court cautioned that “[the Due Process] 
Clause is the only [constitutional] source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the 
Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns.” Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie 
des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982). 
  Because the Robinsons had unilaterally 
 90. In dissent, Justice Marshall argued that cars, because they travel on and are served 
by a “nationwide service network,” put sellers on notice that they may be subject to suit in 
states to which these cars are driven. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 314 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 91. See id. at 297 (majority opinion). 
 92. See id.  This foreseeability inquiry has come under criticism for circularity.  If due 
process depends on reasonable anticipation of a suit, then it plainly does not matter what the 
jurisdictional standard is, as long as putative defendants are on notice that such a standard 
exists. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 25, at 95; CASAD, supra note 22, at 2-60.  
Moreover, the fairness standard adopted in International Shoe was authored by the Court sua 
sponte, without the parties having briefed or argued the case with reference to traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 81 
(6th ed. 2004).  If a landmark jurisdiction case led to a result that surprised both parties, 
foreseeability of litigation is troublesome as a jurisdictional precept. 
 93. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
 94. Id. at 298. 
 95. Id. at 297.  In support of this proposition, the Court cited Gray v. American Radiator 
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961). See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 
U.S. at 298.  The Gray court found jurisdiction proper in a products liability claim over a 
foreign manufacturer that, through a middleman, sent its products into the forum state in 
which they were alleged to have injured the plaintiff. See Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 762, 766 (“[I]t 
is seldom that a manufacturer deals directly with consumers in other States . . . the use of 
[its] products in the ordinary course of commerce is sufficient contact with [the forum state] 
to justify a requirement that [it] defend [t]here.”); see also R. Lawrence Dessem, Personal 
Jurisdiction After Asahi:  The Other (International) Shoe Drops, 55 TENN. L. REV. 41, 52–55 
(1988) (analyzing federal appeals court decisions written between World-Wide Volkswagen 
and Asahi, and determining that “a majority of the federal appellate circuits upheld an 
expansive exercise of stream of commerce jurisdiction, in several cases premised solely 
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moved the car into Oklahoma, a state the defendants had not been trying to 
serve even indirectly, the Court concluded that Oklahoma did not have 
jurisdiction.96
2.  Interpreting World-Wide Volkswagen 
 
The Court decided Rush v. Savchuk97 on the same day it issued its World-
Wide Volkswagen opinion.  In Rush, the Court reiterated its position that, in 
deciding jurisdictional questions, “the inquiry must focus on ‘the 
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’”98  The 
Court had already held that a relationship based on a single contact could be 
sufficient to justify jurisdiction.99  Yet the Court did not articulate what it 
actually meant for a contact to be related to the litigation.100
The stream of commerce test is used to determine whether an out-of-state 
manufacturer’s act constitutes a contact that is related to a jurisdictional 
event that is alleged to have caused harm to a plaintiff.
 
101  But a unilateral 
act by the plaintiff, in which she moves herself and any relevant goods to an 
unanticipated state, satisfies the Court that the stream of commerce has 
dried up before it reached the forum.102
A question remained open, however:  How would a court view a 
defendant’s relationship with the forum in a stream-of-commerce case 
where the plaintiff took no action to bring the product into her home state?  
What if the product was delivered there?
 
103
While that question percolated in the lower courts, the Supreme Court 
continued to hold that, when the harmful effects of a defendant’s conduct 





upon a manufacturer’s foreseeability or awareness”); Trautman, supra note 
  This test, which sustains jurisdiction over foreign defendants 
45, at 175 (citing 
cases to show that, after Gray, courts considered the size of the benefit that a foreign 
corporation received by doing business in a forum in determining the propriety of enforcing 
jurisdiction, and that “the defendant’s interests can be adequately protected without requiring 
jurisdiction over the defendant to hinge on a literal showing of purposeful contacts with the 
forum state”). 
 96. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 
253 (1958)). 
 97. 444 U.S. 320 (1980). 
 98. Id. at 327 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). 
 99. See supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text. 
 100. See Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count:  Due Process Limitations on State Court 
Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 82. 
 101. See Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 766–67 (Ill. 
1961). 
 102. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 103. See Trautman, supra note 45, at 162–64 (foreseeing problems in applying the 
Hanson doctrine to stream of commerce cases, and suggesting that the appropriate way to 
view the corporate defendant’s relationship with the forum would be centered on the benefits 
it received in connection with the forum). 
 104. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 786–90 (1984) (finding jurisdiction in California 
proper over Floridian defendants who had written and edited an allegedly libelous story, 
published in the National Enquirer, about a California resident, despite the defendant’s 
objections that they, as writer and editor, were not responsible for the distribution scheme 
that led the article to be circulated in California); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 
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based on actual or constructive knowledge that their out-of-state conduct 
could cause harm within a forum, has also been endorsed in an international 
context.105  Minimum contacts remained the touchstone of the jurisdictional 
test,106 but once sufficient contacts have been established, their existence 
unlocks the door for courts to consider several other factors in a balancing 
of the equities to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction is 
“reasonable.”107  The regulatory justification for jurisdiction survived, 
recast as the state’s “manifest interest” in giving its residents adequate relief 
if they are injured by out-of-state actors.108
The stream of commerce test was used as one mechanism through which 
reasonableness might be demonstrated.
 
109  But independent of that stream, 
and independent of any notions of consent to suit, a defendant who 
“purposefully directs” goods or activities toward a forum state was also 
subject to the forum’s jurisdiction.110  Courts generally required a specific 
geographical nexus, such that the defendant can be on notice that it is 
subject to suit in a distinct locale, and might buy insurance or simply 
remove itself or its goods from the state to insulate itself from suit there.111  
All that is necessary to provoke defendants to engage in such precaution is 
“fair warning that a particular activity may subject them to the jurisdiction 
of a foreign sovereign.”112
3.  Asahi and the Stream of Commerce Doctrine’s Application to Alien 
Defendants:  Nobody Agrees 
 
In 1987, the Court attempted to apply the stream of commerce analysis to 
an alien defendant.  Gary Zurcher, whose wife was killed in a motorcycle 
accident in California, filed suit against Cheng Shin Rubber, a Taiwanese 
 
770, 781 (1984) (where a defendant has “continuously and deliberately exploited [a] market, 
it must reasonably anticipate being haled into court there”). 
 105. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 49(1) (1971) (“A state has 
power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which has done, or has 
caused to be done, an act in the state with respect to any cause of action in tort arising from 
the act.”) (emphasis added).  The Restatement uses “foreign” in the conventional sense, 
describing cases involving international litigation. See id. § 41 (test of jurisdiction over 
“domestic corporations”). 
 106. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985). 
 107. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 108. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473. 
 109. See id. 
 110. Id. But see C. Douglas Floyd & Shima Baradaran-Robison, Toward a Unified Test of 
Personal Jurisdiction in an Era of Widely Diffused Wrongs:  The Relevance of Purpose and 
Effects, 81 IND. L.J. 601, 629–31 (2006) (arguing that an analysis of a defendant’s “purpose” 
is necessarily subjective, and that it should therefore be irrelevant to the foreseeability 
inquiry); see also Stravitz, supra note 89, at 778 (suggesting that in Burger King, Justice 
Brennan chose the phrase “purposefully directed” in order to broaden the narrower 
“purposefully availed” standard announced in Hanson v. Denckla, thereby creating a more 
inclusive standard that subjects “out-of-state actors causing in-state effects” to suit more 
frequently). 
 111. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
 112. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) 
(Stevens, J., concurring)). 
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company that manufactured an allegedly defective tire tube.113  Cheng Shin 
filed a cross-complaint seeking indemnification by Asahi, a Japanese 
manufacturer of the tube’s component valve assemblies.114  After Zurcher 
settled his claims with all defendants, the trial court was left with Cheng 
Shin’s indemnity claim against Asahi, and the question whether a California 
court might properly exercise jurisdiction over Asahi for the purposes of 
that dispute.115
Asahi had not done any business directly in California.
 
116  All of the 
valve assemblies it had made for Cheng Shin were sent to Taiwan.117  
While Asahi’s sales to Cheng Shin accounted for approximately 1 percent 
of its business, Cheng Shin asserted that 20 percent of its U.S. sales were 
conducted in California.118
Based on the balancing test outlined in World-Wide Volkswagen,
 
119 the 
Court considered the totality of the facts, and unanimously concluded that, 
given the “international context, the heavy burden on the alien defendant, 
and the slight interests of the plaintiff and the forum State, the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction by a California court over Asahi in this instance would 
be unreasonable and unfair.”120  Because (1) the burden on the defendant 
was high; (2) the indemnity plaintiff was not a California resident; and (3) 
California had little interest in the resolution of an indemnity claim between 
alien defendants, the Court held that an exercise of jurisdiction would 
violate “‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”121  
Quoting United States v. First National City Bank, Justice O’Connor noted, 
“‘Great care and reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of 
personal jurisdiction into the international field.’”122
One reason that Justice O’Connor was hesitant to sustain jurisdiction 
over an alien corporation was that the burden of litigating in such a distant 
forum would be “severe,” since Asahi would be required “not only to 
 
 
 113. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105–06 (1987). 
 114. Id. at 106. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 120. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114–16. 
 121. Id. at 113–15 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). But 
see Stravitz, supra note 89, at 794–97 (finding the Asahi Court’s fairness analysis “overly 
conclusory,” because, among other reasons:  (1) the burden on an alien defendant will 
usually be high; (2) an increasingly global economy negates, in part, travel concerns for alien 
defendants; and (3) the absence of a California plaintiff, due only to settlement, should not 
be sufficient to defeat jurisdiction because “subsequent litigational developments” such as 
settlement should not be found to “dislodge[]” jurisdiction if it had been present at the 
outset). 
 122. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115 (quoting United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 
404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting). But cf. FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 27, at 485 (failing 
to anticipate the technological advances that might render state court jurisdiction over alien 
torts a constitutional question); Degnan & Kane, supra note 36, at 813 (arguing that “[i]n the 
international order, there is no such thing as [states],” and therefore other nations are 
indifferent as to whether jurisdiction is exercised over their residents in one state or another, 
as long as jurisdiction in the United States as a whole is valid). 
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traverse the distance between [Japan and California], but also to submit its 
dispute with Cheng Shin to a foreign nation’s judicial system.”123  As 
another policy justification for her reluctance, Justice O’Connor cited 
Professor Born,124 who called for “heightened constitutional scrutiny” of 
jurisdiction over aliens.125
The concern was not that U.S. plaintiffs would suddenly start launching 
frivolous claims against alien defendants because jurisdiction would be 
made easier to acquire.
 
126  Rather, it was that alien courts would grow 
weary of unreasonable extensions of U.S. jurisdiction, and thereby be 
prompted to terminate a relationship of comity.127
This principle, while valid, can be difficult to apply in a jurisdictional 
context for several reasons.  First, the Court had previously referenced 
fairness to future litigants only obliquely.
  In that sense, Justice 
O’Connor appeared to consider “fairness” not only with respect to the issue 
before her, but with respect to the possibility that future litigants would be 
unable to achieve fair results due to a breakdown in comity. 
128  Second, at the time Asahi was 
decided, different nations employed different models of jurisdictional 
fairness,129 many of which are still more favorable to the plaintiff than the 
various models applied in the United States.130
 
 123. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114. But see RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 174 (4th ed. 2001) (“The Court’s description of defendant’s burden reads 
as though Asahi would travel by canoe, had no product liability insurance, and could not, as 
it did, hire excellent lawyers.”). 
  And finally, international 
 124. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115. 
 125. Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 35 (1987).  Professor Born’s warning aside, it is not at all apparent that 
there is a pressing international concern to make sure that close jurisdictional cases are 
decided one way or another. See Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 145, 174–77, 212–14, 226–27 (1973). 
 126. See Dessem, supra note 95, at 80. 
 127. “Comity” refers to the international practice of nations giving respect to each other’s 
judicial acts. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 303 (9th ed. 2009).  The principles of comity 
with respect to international cooperation are similar to the principles of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause with respect to federal cooperation. See supra notes 22, 31 and accompanying 
text.  For a full discussion of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, see 
generally STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY & THOMAS O. MAIN, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 587–670 (2010). 
 128. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 129. See Degnan & Kane, supra note 36, at 847–50 (arguing that because of these 
discrepancies, a state jurisdictional standard based on national contacts will “receive at least 
no worse a reception than those obtained under the current state contacts standard”); von 
Mehren & Trautman, supra note 16, at 1122 (“[N]o fundamental distinction needs to be 
drawn between the jurisdictional problems raised by litigation involving international 
elements arising in an American [state] court . . . and those raised by litigation in which the 
nonlocal elements are connected with sister states.”). 
 130. Germany, for instance, grants jurisdiction over a defendant whenever she owns 
property in Germany, even if that property is unconnected to the litigation. See RICHARD D. 
FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE:  CASES, MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 
143 (3d ed. 2001).  France allows jurisdiction over any defendant as long as a French citizen 
is suing in French court. See id.  And in the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction, the EU 
allows for jurisdiction by necessity, where a defendant may be sued in any EU jurisdiction in 
which a fellow defendant is domiciled. Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 6.1, 2001 O.J. (L 
12) 1, 4–5 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
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corporations sell different goods and carry on business in vastly different 
ways—given this diversity of scope and scale, a jurisdictional inquiry that 
is not fact-based and hews instead to “talismanic formulas” can lead to 
problems in application.131
Regardless of O’Connor’s justifications, a majority of the Justices agreed 
that a fairness analysis is only appropriate if, in the first instance, the 
defendant is found to have the “minimum contacts” necessary to justify the 
equitable inquiry.
 
132  On the question of minimum contacts, the Court 
splintered into three separate opinions, unable to form a majority on the 
question of whether Asahi had sufficient contacts to unlock the question of 
fairness.133
Because Asahi did no business on its own initiative in California, and did 
not purposefully direct its wares or products at the forum,
 
134 the analysis 
came down to an interpretation of the stream of commerce doctrine.135
The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is 
not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.  
Additional conduct . . . to serve the market in the forum State [is 
required]. . . .  [D]esigning the product for the market in the forum State, 
advertising in the forum State, . . . or marketing the product through a 
distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State 
[may suffice].  But a defendant’s awareness that the stream of commerce 
may . . . sweep the product into the forum State does not [create minimum 
contacts.]
  
Justice O’Connor, writing for four Justices, opined: 
136
Justice Brennan, also writing for four Justices, disagreed.  He asserted, 
“As long as a [defendant] is aware that the final product is being marketed 
in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a 





OJ:L:2001:012:0001:0023:en:PDF; see also MCCAFFREY & MAIN, supra note 
  This idea was not new—the notion that a 
127, at 127–
29. 
 131. DAVID EPSTEIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION:  A GUIDE TO JURISDICTION, 
PRACTICE, AND STRATEGY 6-14.1 (3d ed. 1998). 
 132. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 108–09; see also supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 133. See Stravitz, supra note 89, at 788. 
 134. But see supra note 103 and accompanying text (noting that purposeful availment 
may be an inappropriate standard in stream of commerce cases). 
 135. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112, 119–20.  Because of the factual dissimilarities between 
World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi, it has been suggested that the stream of commerce 
analysis in the former case (product unilaterally moved by consumer) is inapplicable to the 
latter (product set in stream of commerce by manufacturer and alleged to have been sold in 
the forum state). See Dessem, supra note 95, at 69–70. 
 136. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.  O’Connor’s theory of jurisdiction has come to be known as 
the “stream of commerce ‘plus’ theory.” E.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N the Water 
Publ’g, 327 F.3d 472, 479 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 137. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment).  The language Justice Brennan uses is likely a tip of the cap to the foreseeability 
analysis in World-Wide Volkswagen, where it was the defendant’s ability to foresee a lawsuit 
in a forum, and not the eventual presence of goods therein, that counted. See supra notes 91–
93 and accompanying text. 
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manufacturer benefits from the efforts of distributors in foreign states, and 
should therefore be subject to suit where its products are sold, was 
interpreted by at least one circuit court to have been the lesson of World-
Wide Volkswagen.138
Finally, Justice Stevens, writing for three Justices, concluded that the 
Court had mixed up the order of the steps in its jurisdictional test, reasoning 
that fairness should be considered before minimum contacts.
 
139  Because he 
agreed with O’Connor’s holding that a California court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over Asahi would be unreasonable and unfair, he concurred in 
the result.140
Apparently for the sake of argument, Justice Stevens scrutinized the 
stream of commerce “plus” test and found that O’Connor’s distinction 
between “mere awareness” that a product will wind up in a forum state and 
“purposeful availment” of that forum was drawn too sharply.
 
141  Although 
Asahi may not have aimed its products toward California, or availed itself 
of the protections of its laws, Justice Stevens believed that Asahi’s 
“quantum of conduct” could satisfy a minimum contacts test.142  Evaluating 
whether this quantum was sufficient to establish minimum contacts required 
a “constitutional determination that is affected by the volume, the value, 
and the hazardous character of the components” in question.143  Though he 
begged off actually conducting this determination, Justice Stevens 
suspected Asahi’s conduct would, “[i]n most circumstances,” be sufficient 
to satisfy minimum contacts scrutiny.144
4.  Judicial Confusion and Scholarly Criticism After Asahi 
 
The dueling Asahi opinions left lower courts and critics with a muddled 
rubric for deciding future stream of commerce cases involving the torts of 
alien corporations.  On one hand, the entire Supreme Court united over the 
visceral notion that jurisdiction over Asahi would be unfair under 
International Shoe.145  But collectively, nobody knew which opinion to 
follow, or how the Due Process Clause interacted with “minimum contacts” 
in the international corporate context.146
 
 138. See Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 198 (5th Cir. 1980). 
  The battle between Justices 
 139. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 121–22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (first finding that an exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable, and therefore 
finding a minimum contacts analysis inappropriate). 
 140. Id. at 121. 
 141. Id. at 122. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id.  In 1974, for instance, a federal district court found that the sale of a single 
construction crane within a state constituted “doing business” within that state, thereby 
leaving the defendant subject to personal jurisdiction. Gorso v. Bell Equip. Corp., 376 F. 
Supp. 1027, 1029, 1031–32 (W.D. Pa. 1974). But see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 n.11 (1980) (rejecting the argument that jurisdiction should be 
sustained solely because a car is a “dangerous instrumentality”). 
 144. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 122. 
 145. Id. at 113–14. 
 146. See, e.g., Degnan & Kane, supra note 36, at 812–13 (because the Due Process 
Clause “regulates only what the courts of one American state can do to persons who are in 
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O’Connor and Brennan, waged over the correct definition of minimum 
contacts in the stream of commerce, had come out a draw,147 while 
Stevens’s brief concurrence picked up support where it could.148
Each of the leading stream of commerce opinions was attacked as an 
inadequate model that departed from the goals, constitutional 
underpinnings, and precedential history of personal jurisdiction.
 
149  Even 
the fairness inquiry, on which each Justice had agreed, fell under 
criticism.150  In the end, the lower courts were left with a splintered set of 
plurality opinions that provided little guidance.151  This is where the 
doctrine stood in October 2001, when Robert Nicastro set to work on a J. 
McIntyre metal-shearing machine.152
II.  THE NICASTRO CASE 
 
Part II examines Nicastro, the Supreme Court’s latest pronouncement on 
the issue of personal jurisdiction.  First, it tells the story of Robert Nicastro 
and the company whose machine came to remove four of his fingers.  It 
then examines the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion, which set forth a 
strict test that insulated the company from the exercise of jurisdiction.  
Next, this part considers the dissent’s argument, which sharply criticizes the 
 
another American state,” O’Connor’s test impermissibly “transformed [the] interest of the 
‘several States’ into the interests of nations”). 
 147. See Angela M. Laughlin, This Ain’t the Texas Two Step Folks:  Disharmony, 
Confusion, and the Unfair Nature of Personal Jurisdiction Analysis in the Fifth Circuit, 37 
CAP. U. L. REV. 681, 727–28 app. A (2009) (charting each circuit and state court’s position 
on whether O’Connor’s, Brennan’s, or neither’s stream of commerce test was correct); see 
also Matthew R. Huppert, Note, Commercial Purpose as Constitutional Purpose:  
Reevaluating Asahi Through the Lens of International Patent Litigation, 111 COLUM. L. 
REV. 624, 642 n.110 (2011) (compiling cases indicating disharmony among the circuits). 
 148. See Stravitz, supra note 89, at 793 (finding that Justices O’Connor and Brennan 
failed to sufficiently analyze the “unique problems posed by component part manufacturers,” 
and that only Stevens’s equitable framework was capable of considering the shades of gray 
inherent in international products liability litigation). 
 149. See Mollie A. Murphy, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce Theory:  
A Reappraisal and a Revised Approach, 77 KY. L.J. 243, 311–13 (1989) (finding that 
O’Connor’s standard was underinclusive, and Brennan’s overinclusive with respect to 
finding jurisdiction over foreign corporations); Todd David Peterson, The Timing of 
Minimum Contacts, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 118 (2011) (faulting both opinions for 
failing to link their minimum contacts analysis to the Due Process Clause in any way); David 
E. Seidelson, A Supreme Court Conclusion and Two Rationales that Defy Comprehension:  
Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 563, 574–
75, 579 (1988) (finding the “plus” test to be impossible to satisfy in some cases where 
jurisdiction is clearly warranted); Stravitz, supra note 89, at 791 (criticizing O’Connor’s 
opinion for failing to account for the precedential value of Gray as hailed by World-Wide 
Volkswagen). 
 150. See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text. 
 151. Several models have been proposed to help lower courts arrive at coherent readings 
of a set of Supreme Court plurality opinions. See Ken Kimura, Note, A Legitimacy Model for 
the Interpretation of Plurality Decisions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1593, 1596–1604 (1992).  A 
splintered set of plurality opinions essentially sends the judicial question back down to the 
lower courts to struggle with, and to select, those opinions with which they agree based on 
whatever criteria they deem persuasive. See Linda Novak, The Precedential Value of 
Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 756, 774–76 (1980). 
 152. See Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am. Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010). 
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plurality for hewing too rigidly to jurisdictional tests and failing to achieve 
a fair result.  Then, Breyer’s concurrence is analyzed.  Finally, a brief look 
at two recent district court cases calls Nicastro’s precedential relevance into 
question. 
A.  A Unique Set of Facts 
On October 11, 2001, Robert Nicastro was working at the Curcio Scrap 
Metal Plant in Saddle Brook, New Jersey.153  On that day, he found himself 
in front of the McIntyre Model 640 Shear, a metal-cutting machine.154  In 
the course of his work, Nicastro’s right hand became entangled with the 
blades of the machine, and four of his fingers were thereby severed from his 
hand.155  The machine had been manufactured by J. McIntyre Machinery, 
Ltd. (J. McIntyre).156  J. McIntyre was incorporated in the United Kingdom 
and sold its machines through McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd. 
(McIntyre America), its exclusive U.S. distributor.157
Despite their similar names, J. McIntyre and McIntyre America were 
separate corporations, with no common operation or ownership.
 
158  
McIntyre America did, however, “‘structure[] [its] advertising and sales 
efforts in accordance with [J. McIntyre’s] direction and guidance whenever 
possible.’”159  While J. McIntyre asserted that it simply sold its machines to 
McIntyre America for distribution, there was some evidence to indicate that 
some machines were sold on consignment to the distributor.160
Seeking compensation for his injury, Nicastro filed suit against both J. 
McIntyre and McIntyre America in New Jersey state court.  The complaint 
alleged that J. McIntyre’s machine was dangerously unsafe because it did 
not include a safety guard, “‘failed to contain adequate warnings or 
instructions,’ and . . . ‘allow[ed] the plaintiff to become injured while 
operating the machine in the normal course of his employment.’”
 
161
Prior to the sale of the machine in question, J. McIntyre officials had 
“attended trade conventions, exhibitions, and conferences throughout the 
United States . . . [while] McIntyre America fielded any requests for 
information about . . . products at the scrap metal conventions and trade 




 153. See id. at 577–78. 
  It was at one such trade show, in Las 
Vegas, where the owner of Curcio Scrap Metal first met with 
representatives of J. McIntyre (the U.K. company) and became interested in 
 154. See id. at 577. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See id. at 579. 
 159. Id. (quoting a January 2000 letter from McIntyre America to J. McIntyre). 
 160. See id. 
 161. See id. at 578 (quoting the plaintiff’s initial complaint). 
 162. Id. at 579. 
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purchasing one of its machines.163  Within a year of that meeting, Curcio 
purchased the machine for $24,900.164
B.  The Plurality Announces a Strict Jurisdictional Rule 
   
The description of Nicastro’s injury in each opinion forecasts the 
opinion’s ultimate conclusion.165  In penning the plurality opinion, Justice 
Kennedy focused on the strict jurisdictional calculus.166  Justice Kennedy 
believed that the “traditional practice” of international jurisdiction was best 
articulated by the stream of commerce “plus” theory,167 and found that a 
New Jersey state court could not entertain a claim against J. McIntyre based 
on the facts of the case.168  In so finding, Justice Kennedy held close to the 
principle that a manufacturer must “‘seek to serve’ a given State’s 
market.”169  A defendant’s “intention to submit to the power of a 
sovereign” is the controlling factor in determining whether it has sought to 
serve the market.170  It is here that Justice Kennedy trotted out a 
surprising171 hypothetical, warning that Brennan’s test,172
 
 163. See id. at 578. 
 if it had been 
adopted would have left a small-time Florida farmer amenable to suit 
 164. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2795 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 165. Compare id. at 2786–87 (plurality opinion) (“Robert Nicastro seriously injured his 
hand while using a metal-shearing machine.”), with id. at 2795 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“[A] three-ton metal shearing machine severed four fingers on Robert Nicastro’s right 
hand.”). 
 166. Id. at 2787 (plurality opinion) (“Freeform notions of fundamental fairness divorced 
from traditional practice cannot transform a judgment rendered in the absence of authority 
into law.”); cf. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 621–22 (1990) (finding that no 
fairness inquiry is necessary when jurisdiction is traditionally valid under a given set of 
facts, because the historical “pedigree” of the exercise of jurisdiction is de facto proof of 
traditional fairness). But see id. at 630 (Brennan, J., concurring) (history itself cannot be 
“decisive,” and “‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice can be as readily 
offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no longer justified as by the adoption 
of new procedures that are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional heritage’” 
(quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977))). 
 167. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.  Though Justice Kennedy did not 
explicitly state that O’Connor’s test is appropriate and Brennan’s is not, the language of the 
opinion implicitly adopts the “plus” standard. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788 (“The 
defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the 
defendant can be said to have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the 
defendant might have predicted that its goods will reach the forum State.”). 
 168. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790–91. 
 169. Id. at 2788 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 
(1980)).  The plurality’s reasoning in this section of the opinion, which attempts to balance 
notions of state sovereignty against individual liberty, while still taking account of fairness, 
has been cited by at least one commentator as evidence of incoherence in the doctrine. See 
Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum 
Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1255–56 (2011). 
 170. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788. But see Dessem, supra note 95, at 68–69 (because 
“intent” is rarely black and white, “to include [it] as an element of personal jurisdiction will 
further complicate an already complex determination”). 
 171. See infra notes 227–31 and accompanying text. 
 172. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
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should his products somehow reach Alaska through a national distribution 
chain.173
In applying his view of the doctrine to the facts, Justice Kennedy found 
that J. McIntyre had not sought to serve the specific forum of New 
Jersey.
 
174  Because J. McIntyre “had no office in New Jersey; it neither paid 
taxes nor owned property there; and it neither advertised in, nor sent any 
employees” there, J. McIntyre had not “purposefully availed itself of the 
New Jersey market.”175  There was, therefore, no lawful jurisdiction in New 
Jersey.176
C.  The Nicastro Dissent:  Whither Fairness? 
 
Justice Ginsburg’s argument in dissent was simple:  Kennedy’s analysis 
was just not fair.177
Is it not fair and reasonable . . . to require the international seller to defend 
at the place its products cause injury? . . .  On what measure of reason and 
fairness can it be considered undue to require [J. McIntyre] to defend in 
New Jersey as an incident of its efforts to develop a market for its 
industrial machines anywhere and everywhere in the United States?  Is 
  In a key paragraph, Justice Ginsburg explained why: 
 
 173. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text.  There 
are a number of problems with this hypothetical.  First, Justice Kennedy does not offer 
support for his assertion that a jurisdictional rule that applies to large alien corporation 
defendants must necessarily also apply to small individual domestic defendants. See 
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790.  Second, the facts of the hypothetical and Nicastro itself are 
vastly dissimilar.  A corporation that attends trade shows across the country and seeks to sell 
its machines from across an ocean cannot be said to be analogous to an “owner of a small . . . 
farm [who] sell[s] crops to a large nearby distributor.” Id.  Third, Justice Kennedy fails to 
account for the possibility of supplementing Brennan’s stream of commerce theory with a 
fairness analysis.  For instance, if courts were to apply Justice Stevens’s standard, see Asahi 
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 122 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring), the 
international distribution of metal-shearing machines capable of severing fingers should 
indeed be regarded differently than the sale of citrus fruits, the occasional poisonous orange 
notwithstanding. 
 174. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790. 
 175. Id.  This line of reasoning had been anticipated by at least one scholar in the wake of 
the World-Wide Volkswagen decision. See Trautman, supra note 45, at 163–64 (“A dealer 
goes into business with the expectation (indeed, the hope) that many different consumers 
will frequent [its] business. . . .  For purposes of asserting jurisdiction, the significant factor 
often is not whether the dealer ‘purposefully’ conducts activities in another state, but rather 
whether the dealer receives a sizeable benefit from the connection with the other states.”).  
Justice Stevens’s proposed case-by-case analysis of the value and hazardous nature of the 
actual product to determine the appropriateness of jurisdiction over alien defendants squares 
with Trautman’s observation much more easily than Justice Kennedy’s bright-line availment 
test. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 176. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791.  At oral argument, Justice Kennedy was sympathetic to 
the doctrinal notion that Nicastro could have sued J. McIntyre in Ohio, where McIntyre 
America was located, but not in New Jersey.  The relationship between manufacturer and 
distributor seemed to persuade Justice Kennedy that it would not offend notions of fair play 
and substantial justice to have Nicastro travel to Ohio to file suit in a state where neither the 
alleged tort nor the resulting injury took place. See Oral Argument at 12:30, Nicastro, 131 S. 
Ct. 2780 (No. 09-1343), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2010_09_
1343?page=1. 
 177. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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not the burden on [J. McIntyre] to defend in New Jersey fair, i.e., a 
reasonable cost of transacting business internationally . . . ?178
Ginsburg felt that Nicastro presented a unique set of facts.
 
179  Given these 
facts,180 the case presented a much better opportunity to apply the stream of 
commerce test in evaluating minimum contacts than Asahi, where the 
Justices could agree on a fairness analysis, but found themselves in disarray 
with respect to the stream of commerce inquiry.181
In Asahi, it had been plainly unfair for a California state court to exercise 
jurisdiction over a Japanese corporation that “did not itself seek out 
customers in the United States, . . . engaged no distributor to promote its 
wares here, . . . appeared at no tradeshows in the United States, and . . . had 
no Web site advertising its products to the world.”
 
182  Given these 
distinctions from the facts of the case before her,183 Ginsburg found that 
reliance on Asahi as controlling authority was “dead wrong.”184
Finally, the dissent raised a point of policy:  the plurality’s holding would 




 178. Id. at 2800–01.  At oral argument, Ginsburg’s objections became particularly 
strenuous when J. McIntyre’s counsel acknowledged that the corporation would be subject to 
suit in Ohio (where the company that distributed its machines was located), an admission 
that all but conceded that litigating in New Jersey could not be a comparatively undue 
burden on J. McIntyre. See Oral Argument at 5:44, Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (No. 09-1343), 
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2010_09_1343 ?page=1. 
 
which is the European Union’s jurisdictional agreement, would have 
 179. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2802–03.  Here Justice Ginsburg wrote in direct conflict with 
Justice Breyer, who believed that Asahi controlled the case as a matter of precedent. See 
infra note 206 and accompanying text.  As discussed earlier, a rigid interpretation of Asahi 
may be problematic when unanticipated fact patterns are presented. See supra note 131 and 
accompanying text. 
 180. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2795–96.  The dissent proposed a holistic understanding of 
jurisdiction, and considered:  (1) the size of the New Jersey scrap metal industry; (2) the 
prominence and breadth of the U.S. trade conventions that J. McIntyre had attended; and (3) 
the fact that J. McIntyre’s sales had generally been better in the United States than in other 
international markets.  This understanding supported Ginsburg’s belief that J. McIntyre 
cared little about which particular states its machines wound up in, and intended to serve a 
national market. But see id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (asserting that these facts could 
not be considered in the Court’s decision because they had not been considered by the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey). 
 181. See supra Part I.C.4. 
 182. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 183. See supra notes 153–64. 
 184. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  If Justice Ginsburg sought 
any guidance from the splintered Asahi opinions, she found it in Stevens’s model of 
considering fairness before conducting a minimum contacts analysis. See supra notes 139–
40 and accompanying text.  Justice Ginsburg did not cite Justice Stevens directly.  But she 
argued that it would be incredible, given the size of New Jersey’s scrap metal industry, to 
assert that a corporation who seeks to distribute its metal-shearing machine to the United 
States did not intend to sell products in New Jersey. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2795–96, 2801 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  To Justice Ginsburg, this intuitive notion was dispositive of J. 
McIntyre’s purposeful availment of New Jersey, and therefore of the existence of minimum 
contacts. Id. at 2801.  Further, Justice Ginsburg echoed Justice Stevens in acknowledging the 
hazardous character of a metal-shearing machine with a “massive cutting capacity.” Id. at 
2795 (internal citation omitted). 
 185. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
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allowed for jurisdiction against J. McIntyre anywhere within the EU for a 
claim brought under the same set of facts.186  That the United States is not a 
party to such an agreement may not be surprising, given international 
recalcitrance to face the “fabulous damage awards”187 handed out by U.S. 
juries in products liability cases, and the U.S. litigational advantages that 
prospective plaintiffs covet.188  But even if conceded,189 these points do not 
make the absence of jurisdiction any fairer to Nicastro, nor the disadvantage 
any less bitter to any U.S. plaintiff injured under similar circumstances.190
D.  Is the Doctrine Old Fashioned?  Modern Technology, 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey, and the Nicastro Concurrence 
 
Before Nicastro reached the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey had grappled with Asahi, concluding that state precedent aligned 
more closely with the Brennan standard than the O’Connor standard.191  
This was old stuff; state and federal courts had been choosing between 
these two standards for decades.192  But having reached that conclusion, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey put its own spin on the fairness 
discussion.193
The court noted that “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice” evolve, and “must also reflect modern truths—the radical 




 186. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2803–04. 
  The court posited that 
because of air travel, defending a suit in New Jersey would not be terribly 
inconvenient for a U.K. defendant who expected to serve at least some 
 187. J.K. Hetrick & Gregg T. Nunziata, Foreign Product Liability Actions in United 
States Courts, in LIABILITY FOR PRODUCTS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY:  THE COMPARATIVE LAW 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 59, 60 (Dennis Campbell & Susan Woodley eds., 
2004). 
 188. See id. at 59–62. 
 189. The concession is for argument’s sake.  If J. McIntyre had been exposed to 
unreasonably high damage awards in New Jersey state court, it may have been more 
appropriate to respond to such challenges by removing the action to federal court. See 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(2), 1441(a) (2006); see also Stephan Wilske & Todd J. Fox, The So-
Called “Judicial Hellholes” in US Jurisdictions and Possible Means to Avoid Them, DISP. 
RESOL. INT’L, Sept. 2008, at 235, 241–42, 247 (discussing venue and removal).  If timely 
effected, removal to federal court does not deprive the defendant of the opportunity to 
contest jurisdiction. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 131, at 6-9. 
 190. See Borchers, supra note 169, at 1260.  Even if adverse state court judgments have 
become prohibitively expensive for alien corporations, Asahi arguably went too far to protect 
these corporations. See In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552, 575 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (“The 
Asahi-Volkswagen approach is particularly pernicious in the advantage it gives to foreign 
producers whose goods enter the American common market.  These firms can organize 
themselves to avoid jurisdiction in any state or federal court. . . .  Because jurisdictional due 
process allows many foreign manufacturers to circumvent the American courts altogether, 
United States residents often will be unable to avail themselves of the strong protections of 
American tort law.”). 
 191. Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 589–90 (N.J. 2010). 
 192. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 193. See Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 591–94. 
 194. Id. at 591.  See also supra note 166 for the Supreme Court’s analysis of the role of 
“tradition” in the jurisdictional framework. 
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American states; moreover, “foreign manufacturers, plying overseas 
markets, should be covered by insurance . . . providing a fund for 
consumers who may be injured by their products.”195  Thus, the court found 
that the exercise of jurisdiction against J. McIntyre in New Jersey was 
neither inconvenient nor unfair.196
Of course, airplanes and insurance existed in 1945 when International 
Shoe was decided, and the facts of Nicastro’s case did not implicate 
technological concerns that Justice Stone could not have envisioned when 
he wrote International Shoe.
 
197  Nonetheless, in a concurring opinion in 
Nicastro, Justice Breyer took the state court’s theory seriously, if not the 
application of it.198  Summoning the specter of the internet, Justice Breyer 
speculated that the plurality’s strict reliance on “submi[ssion] to the power 
of a sovereign” and a defendant’s having “targeted the forum” might lead to 
unfair results if sellers of products in an ever-shrinking world could insulate 
themselves from suit simply by doing business exclusively through internet 
distributors, and never in person.199
In the end, Justice Breyer determined that Kennedy’s minimum contacts 
analysis
 
200 was too narrow, while the New Jersey Supreme Court’s was too 
broad.201  Noting that only one of J. McIntyre’s machines had been 
conclusively proven to have reached New Jersey,202 Justice Breyer felt that 
the case could nevertheless be decided simply as a matter of precedent.203
Justice Breyer did not address the Court’s prior holding that a state has an 
interest in regulating tortious or harmful conduct, and may constitutionally 
exercise jurisdiction based upon the sale of just one item within its 
 
 
 195. Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 591. 
 196. Id. at 591–92. 
 197. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2791 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (“[T]here have been many recent changes in commerce and communication, 
many of which are not anticipated by our precedents.  But this case does not present any of 
those issues.”). 
 198. See id. at 2793. 
 199. See id.  Though the Supreme Court has yet to hear a case on internet personal 
jurisdiction, the issue is by no means new.  Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 
Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997), is the “seminal authority regarding personal 
jurisdiction based upon the operation of an Internet web site.” Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step 
Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2003).  In Zippo, the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania adopted a “sliding scale” that anticipated Breyer’s 
concerns. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.  The scale took into account “the nature and quality 
of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.” Id.  The opinion goes on to 
describe three different points on the scale on which jurisdiction would be proper, improper, 
and factually dependent. Id.  This analysis is beyond the scope of this Note.  But courts have 
already addressed Breyer’s technological concerns about the internet, with a model not 
unlike Stevens’s balancing test in Asahi. Compare Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124, with Asahi 
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 122 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). 
 200. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 201. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 202. Id. at 2792. 
 203. Id. (“None of our precedents finds that a single isolated sale, even if accompanied by 
the kind of sales effort indicated here, is sufficient [to establish jurisdiction].”). 
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borders.204  In McGee, the defendant had directly solicited the purchase of 
an insurance policy from the plaintiff, who lived in the forum, while in 
Nicastro, the machine wound up in the forum through an intermediary.  But 
rather than assessing whether an international distribution scheme made 
Nicastro analogous to, or distinguishable from, McGee,205 Justice Breyer 
looked to Asahi as the governing precedential authority.206  Without 
deciding which test was the better one, he concluded that, under either 
O’Connor’s or Brennan’s Asahi rubric, there was no way J. McIntyre could 
have reasonably foreseen being haled into New Jersey state court when only 
one of its machines actually wound up there.207  Like Justice Kennedy, 
Justice Breyer sought to protect very small manufacturers and sellers,208 
and therefore found that Asahi governed this case, and that there simply 
were not enough contacts to establish personal jurisdiction over J. 
McIntyre.209
E.  Initial Interpretations of Nicastro 
 
Trial courts have had to consider the implications of Nicastro when a 
dangerous product, such as a forklift, allegedly causes an injury.210  In 
doing so, trial courts have found the precedential weight of Nicastro to be 
limited.  Because Nicastro was decided by a plurality, it has been applied 
only on its most narrowly decided grounds:  that is, a strict reliance on 
Breyer’s concurrence and the precedential weight of the Asahi opinion.211
But in Nicastro, Justice Breyer had applied Asahi without declaring 





 204. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); see also supra notes 56–62 
and accompanying text. 
  Therefore, if Nicastro’s only jurisprudential relevance 
is to be extracted from Breyer’s concurrence, very little has changed.  
 205. When an alien corporation sells its products to a U.S. distributor and says, “sell these 
where you will,” there is at least some question as to whether the corporation has solicited all 
fifty states generally. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 206. This is an interesting maneuver, given that Asahi concerned the sale not of a single 
good to a forum through a domestic distributor, but of several thousand component parts to a 
forum through an alien manufacturer. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 
U.S. 102, 121 n.4 (1987). 
 207. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792.  Using foreseeability of litigation as a jurisdictional test 
has been criticized by scholars as circular. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 208. Whereas Justice Kennedy feared that local Floridian farmers would be imperiled by 
a contrary result in Nicastro, see supra note 173 and accompanying text, Breyer indicated 
that upholding jurisdiction based upon a single sale could force an “Egyptian shirt maker” 
and a “Kenyan coffee farmer” who used international distributors to “respond to products-
liability tort suits in virtually every State in the United States,” Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2794 
(Breyer, J., concurring). 
 209. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (plurality opinion). 
 210. E.g., Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-236, 2011 WL 6291812, at *1 
(S.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2011) (wrongful death action in which the plaintiff had been struck and 
killed by the forklift); Lindsey v. Cargotec USA, Inc., No. 4:09-CV-00071, 2011 WL 
4587583, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 30, 2011) (the plaintiff’s leg was run over by a forklift that 
was alleged to have been negligently designed). 
 211. Ainsworth, 2011 WL 6291812, at *2; Lindsey, 2011 WL 4587583, at *7. 
 212. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
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Lower courts can continue to decide personal jurisdiction cases based on 
whichever Asahi test they prefer.213  If that is the state of the law today,214 
then J. McIntyre—and all alien corporations—continue under the 
uncertainty of the old regime.215
III.  A MISSED OPPORTUNITY:  HOW THE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO GIVE 
ROBERT NICASTRO JUSTICE 
 
As discussed in Parts I and II, modern jurisdictional doctrine is grounded 
in a variety of different concepts.  This part argues that the breadth of 
personal jurisdiction’s doctrinal underpinnings presents trial courts with the 
opportunity to achieve more just results. 
This part begins by demonstrating the problems that result if the plurality 
opinions in Asahi and Nicastro are given continued precedential effect.  
Then, mindful of the fact that the exercise of jurisdiction must be fair and 
just, this part proposes a new test grounded in tort law, a field well 
acquainted with balancing the interests of society against the interests of 
litigants to achieve just results. 
Part III is meant to demonstrate that no jurisdictional test is perfect.  
There will always be close cases, where the exercise of jurisdiction may or 
may not be fair depending on who is being asked.  Close cases undoubtedly 
pose difficult questions—but the fact that questions are difficult does not 
diminish their relevance to the litigants. 
A.  As Precedent, Asahi and Nicastro Are Problematic 
Relying on Asahi to decide jurisdictional cases with respect to alien 
defendants would cause significant problems going forward.  First, World-
Wide Volkswagen held that fairness dictates that defendants be able to 
reasonably anticipate being haled into a forum to make jurisdiction 
proper.216
 
 213. See Lindsey, 2011 WL 4587583, at *12 n.6 (noting that after Nicastro, trial courts 
may continue to apply whichever Asahi test is still precedential authority in their circuit); see 
also supra note 
  But different circuits have interpreted Asahi and Nicastro in 
151 and accompanying text. 
 214. The Supreme Court has endorsed the “narrowest grounds” theory with respect to the 
application of plurality opinions. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) 
(citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).  But that raises the question:  By 
what metric is Breyer’s (or any) concurrence decided on the narrowest grounds available? 
See United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 63–65 (1st Cir. 2006) (observing that the 
narrowest grounds are often difficult to discern, and are dependent on the facts of a given 
case); see also Kimura, supra note 151, at 1604 (noting that the “narrowest grounds model is 
inconsistent with the principle of majoritarianism” and has not been satisfactorily explicated 
by the Supreme Court). 
 215. Arguably, if the “narrowest grounds” are to be used in construing the precedential 
authority of plurality opinions, Stevens’s Asahi concurrence should be given weight going 
forward.  In declining to create and apply an expansive view of the stream of commerce 
doctrine, Justice Stevens proposed a fairness-based model that would allow courts to make a 
case-by-case determination of jurisdiction. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 
U.S. 102, 121–22 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 216. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. 
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different ways.217  Surely the lesson of World-Wide Volkswagen is not that 
alien corporations should expect to be haled into courts in certain states 
strictly because of the jurisdictional approach of the circuit in which that 
state sits.  Such a scheme would disadvantage small corporations who wish 
to do business in the United States, but do not have the time or resources to 
pore over every circuit’s personal jurisdiction case law, hoping to determine 
which (if any) part of Asahi that circuit has decided to follow.218
Moreover, the facts of Asahi endow it with dubious precedential 
authority.  Asahi was about resolving a third-party claim against a 
manufacturer of component parts.
 
219  The Court’s reasoning focused on 
how jurisdiction would offend fair play and substantial justice given that set 
of facts.220  But, as J. McIntyre demonstrated, a corporation can take 
significant steps to market its product throughout the United States, derive 
substantial benefit therefrom, and still be insulated from jurisdiction based 
on the rigidity of O’Connor’s test.221
On the opposite side of the spectrum, Brennan’s test could leave orange 
growers
 
222 and shirt makers223 alike accountable to suit whenever their 
goods find their way to a distant forum.224  Jurisdiction over such 
entrepreneurs of limited resources might restrain both domestic and 
international trade, and would therefore be undesirable as a matter of 
policy.225
Nobody can agree on the appropriate test,
 
226 but Stevens’s Asahi 
concurrence seems to at least result in the desired answers to everyone’s 
hypotheticals.  If jurisdiction was premised upon the hazardous nature of 
goods getting shipped across state and international boundaries,227 neither 
Kennedy’s farmer nor Breyer’s shirt maker would be subject to 
unreasonable jurisdiction.  Oranges are not generally dangerous.228  Neither 
are shirts.229
 
 217. See supra notes 
  Clearly, one man who sells a crate of oranges to a local 
146–47, 211–13 and accompanying text. 
 218. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 221. For a counter to O’Connor’s test, see supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 222. See supra notes 167–72 and accompanying text. 
 223. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
 224. See supra note 137. 
 225. See supra notes 122–29 and accompanying text. 
 226. See supra Part I.C.4. 
 227. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 228. See J.W.B. v. State, 419 So. 2d 407, 409 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (hurled oranges 
do not generally cause death or great bodily harm). 
 229. Fruit does get poisoned sometimes.  And shirts are occasionally made out of 
flammable material due to negligent design. See Smith v. J.C. Penney Co., 525 P.2d 1299, 
1301, 1305–06 (Or. 1974).  But one must step back and ask reasonable, fair questions.  
Which is more important:  that orange growers exercise care to make sure their fruits do not 
poison Alaskans, or that airplane manufacturers exercise care to make sure that their planes 
do not fall apart in the air?  Between these two extremes, there will be close cases, where the 
product in question is of a moderately dangerous nature, and a court must evaluate the 
propriety of holding a manufacturer of such a product subject to jurisdiction.  But courts are 
intimately familiar with this sort of balancing test, and are well suited to settle the issue 
through the evolution of common law. See infra Part III.C.1. 
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distributor should not be subject to nationwide jurisdiction, even if one 
orange winds up in each of the fifty states.  The benefit to the seller and the 
risk to society are simply too slight.  On the other hand, when a corporation 
produces massive metal-shearing machines, and sells as many of them as 
possible for tens of thousands of dollars,230 the benefit to the seller and 
concomitant risk to the eventual market each go up substantially.231  How 
dangerous must the good be?  How much benefit is enough to make 
jurisdiction appropriate?  The lower courts are ready, willing, and able to 
supply competent answers to these very questions.232
After all, courts have been unable to agree on the proper jurisdictional 
bedrock in these types of cases, or from what source that foundation is 
derived.
 
233  Initially, residents of separate states were protected from suits 
elsewhere as a means of honoring the Full Faith and Credit Clause while 
still safeguarding state sovereignty.234  But interstate federalism no longer 
carries much water as a jurisdictional principle, and has even been 
discarded in recent decades.235  The best argument for the primacy of 
sovereignty in jurisdictional cases is that “the ‘fairness’ assured the 
defendant by the due process clause presupposes adjudication of the 
defendant’s substantive rights by a legitimate sovereign.”236
Finding state courts hamstrung by the rigidity of a corporate presence 
requirement, the Supreme Court grounded jurisdiction in a theory of 
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
  But this 
proposition produces a chicken-and-egg problem.  Does legitimate 
sovereignty beget fair decisions?  Or is fairness a prerequisite to legitimate 
sovereignty? 
237  Fairness has 
been defined as emanating from a number of sources, including a state’s 
regulatory interest,238 a defendant’s purposeful availment of a forum,239 
holistic case-by-case analyses,240 and federalism concerns.241
In some instances, it is permissible for state courts to assert jurisdiction 




 230. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
  But the 
 231. Standing in the way of this reasonable analysis is World-Wide Volkswagen’s position 
that a “dangerous instrumentality” test is not sufficient to convey jurisdiction upon a state. 
See supra note 143.  But it is not merely the dangerous nature of the good in question that 
controls.  Because volume and value must also be considered, Stevens’s test is not expressly 
forbidden by World-Wide Volkswagen. See supra note 143. 
 232. See infra Part III.C. 
 233. See supra Part I.C. 
 234. See supra notes 30–37 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra notes 11, 89 and accompanying text. 
 236. Murphy, supra note 149, at 291; see also Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 
(7th Cir. 1979) (“[T]he ‘fairness’ standard . . . relates to the fairness of the exercise of power 
by a particular sovereign, not the fairness of imposing the burdens of litigating in a distant 
forum.”). 
 237. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 238. See supra notes 40, 55–59 and accompanying text. 
 239. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
 240. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 241. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 242. See supra Part I.C. 
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specific situations under which such exercises are legitimate are still subject 
to substantial debate.243  With the doctrine still unsettled, the Supreme 
Court was free to approach Nicastro’s case holistically but declined to do 
so.244  In so declining, the Court neglected to ask itself the beguilingly 
simple question that should have controlled the case:  given this unique set 
of facts, what would be the traditionally fair jurisdictional result?245  
Despite this omission, Nicastro’s applicability appears to be limited.246
The accident that befell Robert Nicastro represented an unfair lot in life.  
The pain and suffering that attends the loss of four digits to a saw’s blade is 
unimaginable to the full-fingered among us.
  
Courts may therefore achieve just results based upon the diverse fact 
patterns that international products liability cases present. 
247  But is it also fundamentally 
unfair to force J. McIntyre to defend itself in the state in which the injury 
occurred, instead of the places where J. McIntyre actually entered into 
contracts or delivered the machines?248  In a jurisdictional sense, that very 
same question might be phrased:  when Robert Nicastro’s claim against J. 
McIntyre is adjudicated in New Jersey, has J. McIntyre received due 
process?  The answer to that question lies in the one jurisdictional precept 
that the Court has consistently applied over the last seventy years:  an 
exercise of jurisdiction must comport with “traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.”249
B.  Filling the Void with Fairness 
 
Assuming that it is the Due Process Clause that insulates foreign 
defendants from suits in state courts,250
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be 
determined by reference to any code. . . .  [T]hrough the course of this 
 it is essential to know what process 
is traditionally and fairly due.  The Supreme Court’s precedent 
demonstrates that such conclusions may be drawn only by balancing 
individual liberty against state interests: 
 
 243. See supra Part I.C.4. 
 244. See supra notes 179–84 and accompanying text. 
 245. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.  The dissent did attempt to arrive at the 
right result through a holistic understanding of the case. See supra notes 179–84 and 
accompanying text. 
 246. See supra notes 211–12 and accompanying text. 
 247. It is often the province of juries to imagine the unimaginable when computing 
damage awards.  The case of Robert Nicastro would have been no different had it reached 
trial and a verdict been rendered for the plaintiff. Compare, e.g., Murphy v. L & J Press 
Corp., 472 F. Supp. 411, 413 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (holding that a damages award of one million 
dollars to a plaintiff who had lost four fingers was excessive), with Burnett v. Mackworth G. 
Rees, Inc., 311 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that a damages award of 
over one million dollars to a plaintiff who had lost four fingers was not excessive because it 
did not “shock the judicial conscience”). 
 248. See supra notes 176, 178 and accompanying text. 
 249. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 250. Although this is the rule emphatically announced in Pennoyer v. Neff, it is still open 
for debate whether, after International Shoe, due process is still the bedrock of jurisdictional 
doctrine. See supra notes 33–36, 47 and accompanying text. 
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Court’s decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built 
upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck 
between that liberty and the demands of organized society.251
Essentially, a state’s regulatory interest
 
252 may be considered, using 
“careful scrutiny,” to determine whether a defendant’s right to due process 
has been afforded traditional protection.253
International Shoe therefore correctly identified traditional fairness as the 
sine qua non of due process.
 
254  Determining what is fair enough to 
comport with due process, much like determining what processes are 
traditional,255 requires balancing a state’s regulatory interest against 
individual liberties.256  Standards of fairness, however, necessarily evolve 
over time, as judicial decisions adapt to the conceptions of the day.257  In a 
global economy, where a manufacturer produces machines hoping to sell 
them in as many places as possible,258 it is not unfair to subject that 
manufacturer to suit in a place where it hopes, but does not necessarily 
anticipate, to do business.259
C.  A Tort-Based Analysis Provides a New Test 
 
This section explores why the motivating ideas behind certain classic 
common law torts are also applicable to personal jurisdiction, which can 
itself be seen as a matter of common law.260  It proceeds to analyze 
jurisdiction by examining classic tort concepts (products liability, 
transferred intent, and causation) and applying their modes of analysis to 
jurisdictional questions.  This model of analysis is intended to demonstrate 
that courts will not be lost without a talismanic jurisdictional precept,261
 
 251. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 
367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 
and are quite capable of achieving equitable jurisdictional results. 
 252. See supra notes 47, 62 and accompanying text. 
 253. Moore, 431 U.S. at 502 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 542) (Harlan, J., dissenting). But 
see supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 254. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24–25 (1981). 
 255. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 256. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 24–25 (Because “‘due process’ . . . can never be[] precisely 
defined[,] . . . [a]pplying the Due Process Clause is . . . an uncertain enterprise which must 
discover what ‘fundamental fairness’ consists of in a particular situation by first considering 
any relevant precedents and then by assessing the several interests that are at stake.”). 
 257. See Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) 
(“‘[D]ue process’ . . . is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, 
place and circumstances.  It is compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions.” 
(quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 160 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring))).  With respect to personal jurisdiction, it appears that World-
Wide Volkswagen has come the closest to defining a jurisdictional balancing test that 
comports with traditional notions of fair play. See supra note 15. 
 258. See infra note 299 and accompanying text. 
 259. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 260. See supra notes 23–29 and accompanying text. 
 261. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
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1.  Why Classic Tort Law—and Therefore a State’s Regulatory Interest—Is 
an Appropriate Bedrock of Fairness 
in International Products Liability Claims 
Because the doctrine of personal jurisdiction remains unsettled, trial 
courts still find themselves free to choose which jurisdictional model they 
implement.262  In its earliest form, personal jurisdiction was a corollary of 
international law.263  As a nascent doctrine, it protected out-of-state 
defendants from a broad reading of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.264  It 
became a constitutional principle when the Court came to fear that the state 
might exert physical power against unresponsive defendants, thereby 
depriving them of their liberty.265  This principle weakened as forms of 
exerting adjudicatory power became antiquated.266  Furthermore, corporate 
presence in a given forum became challenging to define with precision, 
necessitating a case-by-case inquiry.267  Today, the various iterations of the 
stream-of-commerce test have come to govern cases against corporate 
defendants, like Robert Nicastro’s.268  Essentially, after two centuries of 
doctrinal development, jurists still do not agree about why the doctrine 
exists.  The only tenet approaching unanimity is that the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant has to be fair.269
But what does fairness require in an international marketplace, where 
goods often land in unforeseeable forums?  A court’s adjudicatory power, at 
its most nefarious extreme, represents an impingement on a defendant’s 
liberty interest.  The subsequent lawsuit threatens to deprive the defendant 
of her property.  And the applicable tort law in the resulting litigation will 
often ascribe liability to people whose actions give rise to unintended or 
unforeseeable consequences.
 
270  Nonetheless, it is fair to hold these people 
liable, and thereby deprive them of their property, in order to regulate 
society’s conduct in the future.  There is no due process violation when one 
is held liable for throwing a stick at a person, missing, and hitting someone 
who was not within his vision.271  These are results that have been intuited 
as fair, and they have become acceptable to courts and citizens alike.272
In determining whether an exercise of personal jurisdiction comports 
with due process, courts can use similar balancing tests to those that they 
have used to determine whether such an exercise is traditionally fair.  After 
all, the goal of tort law is to arrive at a fair and just result by “appropriately 
balanc[ing] the implicated public policies and the autonomy of the 
 
 
 262. See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text. 
 263. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 264. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 265. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
 266. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text. 
 268. See supra notes 135–41, 211–13 and accompanying text. 
 269. See supra notes 47, 254 and accompanying text. 
 270. See infra Part III.C.2.b. 
 271. See infra note 300 and accompanying text. 
 272. See infra Part III.C.2.b. 
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tortfeasor.”273  A tort-based test will enable courts to conduct the “claim-
specific”274 analyses that Justices Stevens and Ginsburg have called for.275  
By focusing on the specific details of each case, courts will be able to avoid 
anomalous and unfair results yielded by strict doctrines.276  Moreover, 
courts have already become comfortable applying tort law principles to the 
question of whether a cause of action is related to the defendant’s contacts 
with the forum.277
Assume for a moment that jurisdiction had not been contested in 
Nicastro.  Barring a settlement, at the end of the trial the jury would have 
been confronted with a products liability case.  Although the metal-shearing 
machine had been adrift in the stream of commerce for a period of time, the 
negligence that caused the alleged defect could not have any harmful 
consequences until that machine came to rest, was purchased, and used for 
its intended purpose—here, cutting metal at a plant, which happened to be 
located in New Jersey.
 
278
The allegations in Nicastro’s complaint, if proven to a jury’s satisfaction, 
would have likely been sufficient to result in tort liability.  But why is this 
fair?  For now, let it suffice to say that, if liability in tort were ascribed to 
the defendant based on the facts in Nicastro, the defendant would be 
deprived of its property.  But there would be no constitutional problem 
because due process would have been given.
 
279
When jurisdiction, and not liability, is asserted based on these same facts, 
thereby impinging upon the defendant’s individual liberty interest,
 
280 due 
process is not violated.  The defendant’s liberty has been adequately 
balanced against the state’s interest in regulating the production and 
distribution of hazardous materials.281
 
 273. Stein, supra note 9, at 691. 
 
 274. Floyd & Baradaran-Robison, supra note 110, at 652 (noting that “claim-specific” 
analysis is appropriate “because the geographic locus of the harm that the law seeks to 
prevent may vary depending on the type of claim for relief that the plaintiff asserts”). 
 275. See supra notes 143, 180 and accompanying text. 
 276. Cf. supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 277. See Note, No Bad Puns:  A Different Approach to the Problem of Personal 
Jurisdiction and the Internet, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1838–41 (2003) (reciting cases that 
apply “but-for” and “proximate cause” tests in resolving whether the cause of action arises 
from, or relates to, the defendant’s contact with the forum).  For a discussion of the “arise 
from or relate to” test, see Mark M. Maloney, Specific Personal Jurisdiction and the “Arise 
from or Relate to” Requirement . . . What Does It Mean?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1265, 
1269–72 (1993). 
 278. See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text. 
 279. Apart from the jurisdictional inquiry, due process will be given when a defendant 
has both notice of the litigation and an opportunity to be heard. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 
U.S. 67, 80 (1972). 
 280. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra notes 11, 169 and accompanying text. But see Dessem, supra note 95, at 
76–77 (noting that the hazardous nature of products in both the jurisdictional phase and the 
liability phase of a trial subjects defendants to a “type of ‘double counting’ disapproved by 
the Supreme Court in the first amendment context” (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 
790 (1984))). 
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2.  Which Tort Laws Are Appropriate Models for Jurisdictional Questions 
in International Products Liability Claims? 
a.  Products Liability Law 
The generally accepted principle that a plaintiff who is unknown to a 
corporate defendant may recover in a products liability suit was not always 
settled law.  In the nineteenth century, privity of contract between the 
manufacturer and user of the product was generally required to establish 
liability.282  Judge Cardozo, however, recognized that when substantial 
danger is likely to result from negligent design or assembly of a given 
product, a contract-based theory of products liability was insufficient to 
protect users from undue harm.283
Cardozo’s theory, now widely accepted,
 
284 is that the state’s regulatory 
interest in ensuring that potentially dangerous goods are produced with 
care285 supersedes the defendant’s interest in not being sued by a previously 
unknown plaintiff with whom it had not been in contractual privity.286  If a 
state’s interest in carefully manufactured goods is sufficient to expose a 
defendant to liability and thereby deprive it of its property,287 even when 
the defendant had no contact with the plaintiff, the state interest may justify 
an impingement of an alien corporation’s liberty interest—even when it has 
not given consent to be sued in a given forum where its products wind 
up.288  This conclusion fits with Stevens’s suggestion to consider the state’s 
interest in regulating trade in hazardous products.289
“‘[T]raditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’ can be as 
readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no longer 
justified as by the adoption of new procedures that are inconsistent with the 




 282. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1055–57 (N.Y. 1916) (Bartlett, 
C.J., dissenting). 
  When Judge Cardozo 
extended the law of liability in MacPherson, he recognized that ancient 
 283. See id. at 1053 (majority opinion). 
 284. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440–42 (Cal. 1944) 
(Traynor, J., concurring). 
 285. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051 (“Because the danger is to be foreseen, there is a 
duty to avoid the injury.”).  Rejecting the argument that only “imminently dangerous” things 
such as “explosives [and] deadly weapons” should trigger liability absent privity, Judge 
Cardozo stressed that manufacturers should be held to a duty of care “[i]f the nature of a 
thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently 
made.” Id. at 1053. 
 286. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 440–41 (Traynor, J., concurring). 
 287. Justice Holmes had long been a proponent of using tort law as a means to achieve 
regulatory ends; when Cardozo discarded the privity rule, he arguably brought the law of 
products liability in line with Holmes’s vision of law as regulation. See John C.P. Goldberg 
& Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1754, 1768 
(1998). 
 288. This conclusion squares with International Shoe’s abandonment of the theory of 
implied corporate consent in favor of a standard that upholds jurisdiction based on the 
impact of the corporation’s conduct. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
 289. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 290. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977). 
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forms had left too many injuries uncompensated.  Because, after Nicastro, 
the old jurisdictional tests have become problematic and inconsistently 
applied,291 because the old tests are unfair to plaintiffs in alien products 
liability cases,292 and because the negative foreign policy implications of 
asserting jurisdiction over alien corporations are debatable,293 a new model 
that focuses on where the dangerous goods are meant to be used, rather than 
sold, should be adopted.  The ancient form of jurisdictional “privity”294 
should be discarded in favor of a more just model.295
b.  Transferred Intent as Purposeful Availment 
  Cardozo has given us 
the first element of a new test:  Was the alien corporation hoping and 
prepared to serve a national market on its own initiative? 
One may now reasonably object:  even assuming a strong state interest in 
regulation of dangerous goods, it is nevertheless an unfair deprivation of 
due process to subject a defendant to jurisdiction when it has not 
purposefully availed itself of the privileges and immunities of doing 
business in the forum state.296  While this is true, it fails to tell the whole 
story with respect to the facts of the Nicastro case.  J. McIntyre had 
produced and sent a dangerous product297 to a large geographical area, the 
boundaries of which were irrelevant298 to the final goal—selling the 
product.299
Such conduct is valid to establish liability over defendants in simple tort 
cases.  In one famous case, a defendant threw a stick at someone within a 
crowd; the stick hit another person whom the defendant had not seen, and 




 291. See supra notes 
  It cannot be said that the defendant in this 
case purposefully directed the stick toward the plaintiff.  Nonetheless, he 
was compelled to give up his property to compensate the person he had 
injured. 
92, 213 and accompanying text. 
 292. See supra Part II.C. 
 293. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text. 
 294. See supra notes 282–86 and accompanying text. 
 295. When old doctrines become obsolete, cases like MacPherson are useful (and perhaps 
necessary) to move the law in a direction more suited to achieving beneficial ends through 
regulation. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 287, at 1845–46.  Arguably, notions of due 
process that overprotect individual rights at the expense of state regulatory ends are as 
outmoded as the notion of privity that MacPherson discarded. See id. at 1842–46. 
 296. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
 297. See supra note 165. 
 298. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 299. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2796 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (quoting J. McIntyre’s president, who had said “[a]ll we wish to do is sell our 
products in the [United] States—and get paid!”). 
 300. Talmage v. Smith, 59 N.W. 656, 657 (Mich. 1894) (“The right of the plaintiff to 
recover . . . depend[s] upon an intention on the part of the defendant to hit somebody, and to 
inflict an unwarranted injury upon some one.  Under these circumstances, the fact that the 
injury resulted to another than was intended does not relieve the defendant from 
responsibility.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 16 cmt. a (1965). 
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Much in the same manner, J. McIntyre did not purposefully direct its 
machine toward New Jersey.  J. McIntyre did, however, direct its wares 
toward the national market—essentially, a crowd—of which New Jersey 
was a member.301  The machine was sent to Ohio; from there, it might have 
been launched into any state where McIntyre America could find a 
buyer.302  Given the size of New Jersey’s scrap metal market,303 it was 
altogether possible that, even if J. McIntyre did not aim the machine at New 
Jersey, it might nonetheless “hit” someone there.304
Transferred intent applies only to intentional torts, but in the 
jurisdictional context, the purposeful availment of a forum is the relevant 
intent.  And that availment, when directed from abroad at a generalized 
location, may be transferred when predictable harm results.
  Just as fairness and 
due process permit a plaintiff to recover from a defendant who never 
wished to hurt him, due process permits a state to exercise jurisdiction over 
a defendant who purposefully directed potentially dangerous goods at a 
large area without explicitly stating an intention to serve particular states 
within that area. 
305
As a jurisdictional matter, there is little difference between this scientist 
and J. McIntyre.  Each constructed a dangerous product that might cause 
harm in some unidentified location.  Neither should be allowed to back out 
if their constructions are alleged to cause harm in an unforeseen forum.  The 
second element of the new test thus becomes clear:  Did the alien 
corporation send a potentially hazardous product to a general area of which 
the forum state was a foreseeable member? 
  Imagine that 
a mad scientist in Glasgow set up a long-range rocket launcher in his 
backyard.  If he were to negligently handle the launcher, and his rocket 
traversed the Atlantic and caused harm in Kansas, he cannot be heard to 
complain that he could not have foreseen litigation in Topeka.  A rocket 
launcher is dangerous; long-range rockets may land anywhere, even though 
it cannot be said precisely where.   
c.  Negligence “at Rest” 
In 1919, a young lady was let off a train approximately a mile past her 
intended stop, a mishap occasioned by the negligence of the railroad on 
which she traveled.306  Soon after she got off the train and began to walk 
back to her intended destination, the lady was raped.307
 
 301. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
  The Supreme Court 
 302. See supra note 299 and accompanying text. 
 303. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 304. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 1 cmt. b (2010) (“[S]o long as the injury to the actual victim arises from the risks 
that made the actor’s conduct tortious, that harm can be deemed within the scope of the 
actor’s liability.”). 
 305. See supra notes 143, 228–29. 
 306. See Hines v. Garrett, 108 S.E. 690, 691 (Va. 1921). 
 307. See id. at 691–92. 
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of Appeals of Virginia held that the railroad’s negligence proximately 
caused the misfortune she suffered.308
Nineteen years before this incident, a different woman was let off a train 
one stop past her destination, also through the negligence of the railroad.
 
309  
But in that case, the conductor escorted the passenger to a hotel room.  That 
night, a kerosene lamp exploded in the room and caused her hands to be 
badly burned.310  There, because the conductor had taken the plaintiff to a 
place at which his negligence could no longer be the foreseeable cause of 
the injury suffered, the Supreme Court of Georgia found that the railroad’s 
negligence was not a proximate cause of the injury suffered.311
The difference between the foregoing cases is intuitively clear.  In the 
former, the railroad’s negligence was still at work when harm befell the 
woman.  The very type of harm that a mistaken drop-off tends to cause was 
still in the air—that of a traumatic assault in an unfamiliar area.
 
312  In the 
latter case, however, the railroad’s negligence was at rest.  Being dropped 
off at the wrong station does not tend to cause one’s hands to be burned by 
a kerosene lamp.313
But how does this matter in a jurisdictional sense?  It is a question of the 
type of harm a negligently designed product tends to cause.  A scrap metal 
machine cannot cause its usual sort of foreseeable harm until it arrives at 
the sort of place where its blades are set spinning.  The machine is not 
likely to do harm while sitting in an Ohio warehouse waiting to be shipped.  
And until it begins shearing metal, it cannot possibly inflict the sort of harm 
that Nicastro suffered.  In a common case like this, the machine’s arrival in 
the forum precedes its activation.  In other words, the foreseeability 
question—whether J. McIntyre could reasonably anticipate being haled into 
court in a given forum—is not “at rest” until the machine starts shearing.  
Kennedy’s belief that J. McIntyre is rightly subject to suit in Ohio when its 




 308. Id. at 693–94 (“The precise injury need not have been anticipated.  It is enough if the 
act is such that the party ought to have anticipated that it was liable to result in injury to 
others.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 
is misplaced.  While the machine waits in Ohio, the locus of potential 
jurisdictional sites is still “in the air”; the machine is not yet in a place 
where it might conceivably do harm.  This provides the third and final 
element of a jurisdictional test in such cases:  Could the defendant’s alleged 
 309. See Cent. of Ga. Ry. v. Price, 32 S.E. 77, 77 (Ga. 1898). 
 310. See id. 
 311. Id. at 77–78. 
 312. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Intervening Wrongdoing in Tort:  
The Restatement (Third)’s Unfortunate Embrace of Negligent Enabling, 44 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1211, 1238–40 (2009) (arguing that the result in Hines was justified because railroads 
and carriers are expected to bring customers to their destination, and are therefore subject to 
a heightened standard of liability when they fail to meet the goal of safe arrival). 
 313. See Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause and the Law of Negligence, 69 IOWA L. REV. 
363, 438–39 (1984). 
 314. See supra notes 175–76 and accompanying text. 
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misconduct have caused the plaintiff harm in any other forum?315
CONCLUSION 
  If not, 
jurisdiction in the state where the harm occurred should be proper. 
In a separate opinion in International Shoe, Justice Black said that he 
could not settle jurisdictional precepts on the Court’s notion of “‘fair play,’ 
however appealing that term may be.”316
There will be times when a court is confronted with a situation where the 
fair result is not clear; where it must struggle to balance the equities, and 
perhaps even come up with a result that the litigants could not have 
foreseen.
  But after decades of confusion, 
difficulty, and dissonant voices in the field of personal jurisdiction, it 
appears that little else is left. 
317
Courts that attempt to apply fair and just jurisdictional standards often 
look to hypotheticals to justify their chosen rules.
  But Robert Nicastro probably could not have foreseen coming 
in to work on October 11, 2001, and leaving with four fewer fingers than he 
had when he awoke.  Less could he have foreseen that he might have had to 
sue for redress not in the state where the tort happened, but in England, or 
more incomprehensibly, Ohio, simply because of some obscure doctrine, 
unknown to most tort victims, and too incoherent to be fully comprehended 
by sophisticated corporations. 
318  In dreaming up unfair 
consequences to imagined litigants, the Supreme Court has applied 
jurisdictional rules to tort victims with regard only to how their rules apply 
on the margins.319
 
 315. This element of the proposed test is reconcilable with the Court’s finding that there 
was no jurisdiction in World-Wide Volkswagen and Hanson v. Denckla.  Unilateral border-
crossing by plaintiffs may defeat jurisdiction because the harm could have occurred in the 
state of origination. See supra notes 
  But in resorting to such hypotheticals, the Court stands 
to ignore the most compelling fact patterns of all—the cases that actually sit 
before it.  This Note’s proposed test would give courts the flexibility to 
consider particularized harm to particularized litigants without being unduly 
burdensome to alien corporations.  Such a rule might, on occasion, expose 
these corporations to jurisdiction in cases that might not have met the 
plurality’s standards in Nicastro or Asahi.  But that is simply a reasonable 
price of selling hazardous materials to U.S. consumers and businesses.  
Shirt makers and orange growers will not be exposed to additional liability 
under the proposed rule because of the less harmful nature of their products.  
But corporations who sell large, dangerous machines will be.  And if J. 
McIntyre had deemed this too great a price to pay for the opportunity to do 
business in the United States, Robert Nicastro might still have a full right 
hand.  Jurisdictional questions aside, that might have been the fairest 
outcome of all. 
68, 96 and accompanying text. 
 316. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 325 (1945) (opinion of Black, J.). 
 317. The Court in International Shoe arrived at just such a result. See supra note 92 and 
accompanying text. 
 318. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 319. See supra notes 173, 208 and accompanying text. 
